

Indigenization for Development: The Case of Southeast Asia

CPA RESEARCH TEAM*

The process of indigenization of public administration technology for development necessitates an examination of (1) the socio-cultural-historical conditions of a developing country and (2) the native characteristics and institutions that promote or hinder national development. In this context, the experience of five Southeast Asian nations, i.e., Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore and the Philippines, in two areas, namely, their civil service systems and their rural development programs, are analyzed. Whether the source of technology is Western or Asian, the interest of the nation should be the primary consideration.

Introduction

In its working paper entitled "Man as the Center of Development," UNESCO considers the significance of endogenous development in the Third World Nations. The paper claims that:

Development is no longer seen merely as a race to catch up with the more favored nations, which was the idea until recently, but rather as a turning to account of the developing societies' own potentialities in addition to a fairer distribution of wealth at the national and international level. . . . Cultural identity and certain forms of authenticity are now called for as factors in development.¹

However, the paper argues that such a development necessitates the transfer of knowledge from different cultural settings to hasten economic modernization. It is for this reason that UNESCO recognizes the need to conduct studies on the "conditions under which such transfers can be effected while respecting

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cultural identities." Moreover, it contends that "the results of these studies should make it possible to reconcile aid from foreign sources with the emergence of original styles of development and thereby avoid any form of cultural domination based on scientific and technological power."² This study is a response to UNESCO's call for defining "possible paths for indigenous and original development."

To fulfill this objective, this study assesses the adoptions and adaptations of styles, methods, techniques and structures of public administration in the Southeast Asian region. This study also attempts to examine the facilitating and impeding factors stemming from socio-cultural conditions, systems of values and motivations affecting adoptions and adaptations in public administration.

More specifically, this research seeks to answer the following questions:

(1) What colonial experiences or international relations (i.e., foreign consultants or local technocrats influenced by their foreign training) have significantly affected the current *structures* and the *methodologies* for public administration in Southeast Asia?

(2) To what extent have these influences affected the public administration systems of these countries? Are these well-integrated or received by local practitioners and what factors have facilitated this? Have they fulfilled the attainment of stated objectives? What problems have the different countries experienced in the process of adoption?

(3) Were there adaptations made formally or informally regarding these adoptions in view of their socio-cultural setting? Have these adaptations favorably or unfavorably affected the attainment of specified goals and objectives? What indigenous factors have influenced the quality of adaptations?

(4) In the various stages of adoptions and adaptations of structure and methodologies, was people participation at all fostered and fulfilled?

Techniques for data collection included review of documents, conference papers, books, written reports and other written materials on the experiences of the Southeast Asian region, whenever the data were available for the countries in the region. No recent materials were available for the countries in Burma and the Indochina states. Interviews were also conducted with knowledgeable practitioners and scholars.

To reconstruct the experiences of five Southeast Asian countries in adoption and adaptation for endogenous development, this research utilizes two areas for intensive analysis: the civil service system and rural development programs. The five Southeast Asian countries are Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore and the Philippines.

The study attempts to identify common or atypical cases of adoption and adaptation. Where possible, these cases were fitted in a matrix distinguished

according to the stage in program execution, the source of the innovation and whether or not the practice is common or atypical.

<i>Source</i>	<i>Planning</i>	<i>Implementation</i>	<i>Evaluation</i>
<i>Western</i>			
Common	PPES	Coordinating councils, competitive examination	MIS
Atypical		Operations Research in Malaysia	
<i>Non-Western</i>			
Common			
Atypical		Barrio Immersion in the Philippines	

The study covers four parts. The first part describes the colonial experience of countries in Southeast Asia. This includes a treatment of the post-independence challenge of these countries and the concomitant response of adopting public administration technology from the West.

The second part focuses on the adaptation experience of Southeast Asian countries as reflected in the structures and processes in the civil service system and in rural development programs. The third part looks at the problems encountered in the process of adaptation. The fourth part presents a review of the concept of indigenization and administrative reform.

Southeast Asia's Colonial Past

The colonial experience has undoubtedly influenced the administrative formation of countries in Southeast Asia. All countries in the region except Thailand were subject to long periods of direct colonial tutelage. Indonesia was under the colonial rule of Portugal, the Netherlands, Japan and Great Britain. Dutch rule as the longest in Indonesia resulted in the consolidation under one central authority of the fragmented powers of indigenous sultanates. Malaysia was also under the rule of Portugal, the Netherlands, Great Britain, and Japan. Singapore was a colony of Great Britain and was for a time also occupied by Japan. The Philippines was a colony of Spain and the United States. Great Britain and Japan for brief interludes occupied the Philippines. Burma also came under British rule, while France ruled Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. On the other hand, Thailand was and still is impressed with the Western model of bureaucracy despite the absence of direct colonial rule.

The Western colonizers imposed their own system of governance and administration over some of the Southeast Asian countries for over three centuries. The relationship between the colonizers and the colonial states was one of exploitation and subordination. Raw materials such as the natural and mineral resources of these countries were extracted and sent to the Western colonizers. Involuntary levies, duties or tributes were imposed on the populace—aside from forced and unpaid labor—to increase the wealth of the colonial masters or sustain their affluence and greed. The consequence of the oppressive colonial rule was disastrous to the spirit and will of the indigenous population to forge a national identity. However, this experience also served as the catalyst in the revolutionary demand to expel the colonizers, to seek reforms and redress, and to develop a national consciousness out of warring and parochial factions.

The colonial rulers brought to Southeast Asia the idea of a nation-state and the ideals of modernization. Divided factions, sultanates, or tribes were formally grouped together through force, conquest, diplomacy or negotiations. Geographic boundaries were delineated even if artificially or arbitrarily made so as to incorporate under one territorial jurisdiction the various peoples. To exert control and authority over these people necessitated the establishment of a colonial administration which superimposed power over local or native rulers. The colonial rulers sent expatriates as administrators or soldiers. In other cases, Indians were brought over to Burma or Malaysia as civil servants. With the exception of the Americans in the Philippines, the colonial rulers did not prepare the indigenous population to serve in the colonial administration. The regime in the colonies was characterized as highly centralized, law- or rule-oriented, corrupt and unresponsive to the needs of the populace, and discriminatory or condescending towards the indigenous population. The natives were not fit to govern by themselves, a reasoning which was naturally self-serving.

However, while the colonizers exerted pressures to control and consolidate their reign, their dominance did not penetrate closely into the traditional setting, particularly in the rural countryside. The mark of dominance was visible in the primate cities or colonial capitals but not in the periphery where most of the population resided. An institutional gap in the colonial rule existed which allowed the preservation of some vestiges of traditional life and values. Spanish control over the Philippines did not crush the sultanate system among the Muslim Filipinos in Southern Philippines. The British recognized the various sultans in Malaya, Borneo and Sabah. The Dutch never engulfed the traditional leaders and did not destroy the regional or island loyalties of the Indonesians. It was not simply a matter of "divide and rule" approach³; it was just physically impossible for a handful of colonial rulers to wipe out traditional practices and norms, much less to understand what these meant to the natives. The colonizers were no match to the ingenuity and sublime resistance

of the natives to the external forms of influences. The indigenous populace adopted the form but not the substance. In the process, the adaptation of the imposed forms took place with or without the notice of the colonial rulers.

Transfer of Public Administration Technology

During the colonial period, the emphasis was on law and order, collection of taxes and defense of the colonies. With the grant of independence, however, there emerged a rethinking regarding the goals of development. The first concern was, of course, nation-building and reconstruction. In line with this, the Southeast Asian nation-states sought to establish a national identity and protect the nation from both external and internal security threats. The second concern was socio-economic development with the end in view of redressing the imbalance among social and racial groups within geographical regions of a country, as for example, providing for economic equity between the Malays and the Chinese in Malaysia.

Among the Southeast Asian nations, Thailand alone remained the exception as she was never under direct colonial rule. Nevertheless, the rulers of that country looked towards the expertise of foreign advisers and educators in running the government. Siffin⁴ recounts the recruitment to Thailand of such foreign advisers in the late 19th century to modernize the government and advance education. A large number of British nationals were recruited, although there were also French, Americans and Japanese advisers.⁵

These foreigners filled the gap between the commitments and the administrative capacities of the Post-Reformation government. Foreigners dominated the managerial levels of many, if not most, of the newly introduced administrative agencies. They set the tone of administration, and their contribution to the central values of the new bureaucracy was significant. In the case of Thailand, it was a deliberate and voluntary choice to adopt Western forms of administration, a desire ushered in as a consequence of the demise of a strong, paternalistic and unquestioned royal government.

French influence pervaded the Indochinese states which included Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos. The superior administrative model attractive to these states was the French model even after the Americans came to replace the French in that region. The development of the administrative system in Vietnam, however, was also influenced by the Chinese before the coming of the French. Dang⁶ described the ten centuries of Chinese domination that brought about a centralized system of government. In Cambodia, the French civil servants administered the bureaucracy as in Vietnam. The indigenous Cambodians held only minor positions in government or acted only as "figure heads" at high levels.⁷ In fact, some Vietnamese were recruited in administrative positions. French intervention in Cambodia began as early as 1846 and

culminated in a gunboat show of force in 1884 to achieve the complete takeover and formation of a French Union consisting of the Indochinese states.

Unlike in Cambodia where the King remained supreme, the King in Burma was deposed by the British imperialists. Thus, the British rule was not indirect; it was not through the use of traditional institutions.⁸ Rather, Great Britain established an entirely new administrative structure through a Governor-General who was a representative of the Viceroy of India. Burma was divided into eight administrative regions in a "ruthlessly logical fashion"⁹ disregarding the traditional boundaries respecting the Burmese practices and concepts. A three-tiered civil service was installed which included the following: Class I (elite) composed of Indians and Europeans; Class II (provincial) consisting of local recruits or Burmese and Eurasians; and Class III (subordinate) comprising the government clerks.¹⁰

Malaya, now known as the Federation of Malaysia, was ruled by Great Britain until 1957. The independent political units of Malaya prior to British colonization were governed by "a number of independent Sultans."¹¹ Such indigenous nobilities were kept intact under the British regime. The long British rule through the Viceroy of India was replaced by the creation of a Straits Settlement Government in 1866.¹² This system governed the nine Malay states, the colonial settlements of Malacca and Penang, and the crown colonies of Sarawak and North Borneo. Singapore, then a small island community, was also included under this settlement government.

The Philippines was ruled by an autocratic Governor-General under Spain for over three centuries. The Governor-General wielded all political powers including the judicial powers as president of the Royal Audiencia, the highest tribunal at that time. In 1899, the Americans replaced the Spaniards as colonial masters thus introducing the American pattern of civil administration. Although the American Governor-General was dominant, he shared his powers with other branches of government. The doctrine of separation between the state and church was an important change from the active role of the Catholic Church in civil administration under Spain. With the grant of independence in 1946, the Philippines continued subscribing to the American model of government and administration until 1972.

Indonesia was under Dutch rule the longest. Prior to colonization, Indonesia was not under any united political system, but the Madjapahit Empire which extended over parts of Indonesia exerted some political, cultural and religious influence. The Dutch approach to colonize Indonesia was a highly centralized one. Dutch rule formally ended in 1945 when a constitution was framed by nationalist leaders following the end of World War II. However, the Dutch attempted to reaffirm its colonial powers, until 1959 when the Netherlands stepped out. The Americans attempted to fill in the role of the Dutch colonizers. However, as Braibanti¹³ observed, American influence was superficial and concentrated more on the economic planning function. Moreover,

U.S. influence "scarcely penetrated the inner administration, which remains an indigenous adaptation of Dutch colonial practices."¹⁴

The training of officials for the civil service provides a clue as to the involvement of external agencies and other governments. Table I shows that the earliest training institute was that of Cambodia which began in 1917 under the sponsorship of France. Only Thailand initiated its own educational center, the Thammasat University, for preparing candidates to enter the civil service. Subsequently, it evolved into a special institute for public administration within the same university and expanded into a full blown National Institute for Development Administration outside the university and located under the Office of the Prime Minister of Thailand. Of the eight Southeast Asian countries, six countries were directly assisted by the United States in establishing a public administration training institute. Multilateral and bilateral foreign assistance programs were also part of the process of training individuals in the region to assume responsible positions in the bureaucracy. Under these programs, nationals were sent abroad to study or observe public administration. Moreover, consultants were dispatched to these countries to provide assistance in administrative reforms and socio-economic planning.

Infusion of Indigenous Public Administration

Despite conscious efforts of the colonizers to transfer western public administration technology, the resilience and persistence of what is known as traditional or indigenous is apparent in the experiences of the Southeast Asian countries. The external influence had been limited to the form or structure but not the content. In Burma, Pye wrote that the "British authority... had the deceptive appearance of continuity. Although in its fundamentals the British introduced a profoundly different system, little change showed on the surface."¹⁵ The same reflection applies to Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia or the Philippines.

Even the institution-building approach did not penetrate the facade of acceptance of Western norms and practices. So much investment had been made on establishing institutes of public administration using essentially transplanted curriculum, approaches and textbooks. The University of Pittsburg¹⁶ evaluated the Thai experience and concluded that the expectation of creating norms and values in administration which were different from the existing Thai bureaucracy "ran afoul," that is, these were not completely realized. The approach was "essentially inconsistent with the important normative features of the Thai bureaucracy"¹⁷ and did not take into account its "limited capability" to absorb the new technologies.

Although the purpose of the transfer of technology is to introduce notions of efficiency, effectiveness, productivity, rationality, simplicity, openness, and responsibility, it seems that the countries in the Southeast Asian region

Table 1. Institution Building for Public Administration

<i>Country</i>	<i>Name of Institution</i>	<i>Year Established</i>	<i>Sponsor</i>	<i>Contracted Institute</i>	<i>Function</i>
Vietnam	◦ National School of Administration	1952	France	—	Middle Level Executive Training
	◦ National Institute of Administration	1955	U.S.A.	Michigan State University	Training-Research
Cambodia	◦ Ecole Royale d' Administration	1917	France	—	Senior Level Executive Training
Laos	◦ Centre National d' Etudes Politiques, Administratives, et Juridiques	1959	U.N. France	—	Junior/Middle Level Training; Consultancy
Burma	◦ University of Rangoon		Burma	—	Training of Civil Service Officials
Malaysia	◦ Government Officers Staff Training Center		Ford Foundation	Harvard Advisory Services	Civil Service Training
	◦ National Institute for Public Administration	1972			Training-Research
Thailand	◦ Institute of Public Administration—Thammasat University	1955	U.S.A.	Indiana University	Teaching-Research Training
	◦ National Institute of Development Administration (formerly IPA)	1966	Ford Foundation	—	Interdisciplinary Teaching Training-Research
Philippines	◦ Institute of Public Administration—University of the Philippines	1952	U.S.A.	University of Michigan	Teaching-Research-Training; Consultancy
Indonesia	◦ Lembaga Administrasi Negara (National Institute of Administration)	1957	U.S.A.	Indiana University	Teaching-Research; Consultancy

cannot claim to have achieved them despite the long period of colonial tutelage, foreign technical assistance and training. Esman¹⁸ wrote that in Malaysia:

The American-inspired political management notion that the power of persuasion and demonstration could induce senior officials to undertake reforms with a minimum of compulsion proved to be unsuitable in the Malaysian administrative environment.

Dang¹⁹ developed the concept of administrative dualism which he defined as "two different systems of administration having different administrative philosophies (which) exist in a given national territory." An example would be Vietnam's administrative culture before the withdrawal of American armed forces in 1976, which could be described as dual in the sense that the indigenous (Vietnamese/Chinese) and Western (French/American) norms, concepts and procedures were interacting simultaneously.

The demand for the change in the people holding administrative positions was variously known as Burmanization, Malayanization, Filipinization or Indonesianization. In Malaysia, the idea of Malayanization was first brought up as early as 1896. The idea then was to "economize in the administration of the country" and to establish a straits settlement government.²⁰ Thus, the creation of the Malay administrative service in 1910 did not mean that the indigenous Malays would become in control of key administrative posts. In fact, the colonial expatriates continued to do so until 1956.

Replacement of expatriates in Burma, Malaysia, or the Philippines was always recommended on a gradual basis so as not to disrupt services and disrupt the lives and career of the expatriates, and to give time for the indigenous populace to get training. In fact, the Malayanization committee of 1954 stated that the replacement of expatriates should be done on a gradual or normal attribution basis. There was the fear that the bureaucracy would be saturated with "less competent" civil servants.²¹ In 1956, impatience gave way and a more rapid change took place through "premature retirement of expatriates." In fact, Esman²² bluntly wrote that the Malays who replaced the expatriates "were, on the whole, far less educated, trained or experienced in high level decision-making or in managing large-scale action programs." In the Philippines, there was a conscious strategy to train the Filipinos who would gradually carry on administrative responsibilities. In Indonesia or Burma, no such preparation was designed by the colonial administrators.

As early as 1957, the director of the Philippine Institute of Public Administration urged that a public administration training program should seek two objectives, among others. These were: (1) to build a better understanding of the contemporary Philippine community and of the forces that are shaping or reshaping it; and (2) to develop a better understanding of how basic attitudes, traditions and practices in public administration may promote or retard the economic and social progress of our nations.²³

There was an increasing need to recognize the positive aspects of preserving or grafting traditional cultures, norms and practices into the public administration model. Inayatullah affirms that the development of a country depended largely on the recognition of its specific historical and social setting. Foreign models or approaches were neither relevant nor appropriate to the needs of the developing countries. The burden of evolving an appropriate model lies on the "society itself, by examining what it can learn and maintain from its own history and culture, by full comprehension of the constraints and opportunities available in its internal and external environments."²⁴

A case in point was the study by Ingle²⁵ on the interaction between the traditional and modern legal systems in Thailand. There was no conflict between the two systems; in fact, the traditional value for compromise rather than confrontation enhances the promotion of justice. The human value—or the spiritual well-being of the individual—is far more significant than the material object, reward or restitution by payment. Machado²⁶ also underscored the manner of conflict resolution in a Philippine province which recognized the intricacies of the socio-cultural elements among parties to a legal dispute.

When a Thai says "mai pen rai" or a Filipino, "walang ano man" (both meaning "it is of no importance" or "never mind"), he refers to a behavior which gives more importance to developing personal relationships at the human level and not through official or ascribed status. In both Thai and Filipino contexts, personalism dominates the bureaucratic culture. Siffin²⁷ wrote: "there is no sharp distinction between official status and personal status in a broader sense." He added that: "Defining status, ordering personal relationships, and setting the terms of personal achievement and survival are much more meaningful than assertions about substantive output goals and abstract values such as administrative efficiency."²⁸ Such has been the attribute of the "stable, relatively adaptable, essentially traditional bureaucracy" in Thailand.²⁹

The infusion of indigenous public administration was thus the result of the following needs of countries in the region:

(1) *Decolonization/neocolonialism*. There was a felt need to replace the colonial expatriates with indigenous people and to wipe out vestiges of neo-colonialism;

(2) *Self-reliance*. There was the need to use local resources, intermediate technology and labor intensive strategies, in the attempt to manage under scarce or limited resources;

(3) *Redistribution and equity*. Wealth and power had to be redistributed according to class, ethnic or regional groupings;

(4) *Participation*. There was the need to participate in decisions that affected the citizenry;

(5) *Conflict-resolution*. Consensus-building through social harmony should be emphasized rather than the confrontational approach; and

(6) *Delivery of services.* Local indigenous practices and institutions were to be tapped to serve as alternative means of delivering social services and making such services more accessible to the people.

Underlying these issues was the recognition of the failure of existing administrative strategies to provide the impetus for development and to make services accessible, available and acceptable to the people. It was no longer a sufficient guarantee to achieve development through a hierarchical, centralized bureaucratic structure, but through a more meaningful people-participative process.

The Adaptation Experience

To document the adaptation experience of the five Southeast Asian nations, namely, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore and the Philippines, two areas have been selected for intensive analysis: the civil service system and rural development programs. In this respect, indigenization, as implemented in these countries was mainly a response to the clamor for administrative reform in the aftermath of independence from colonial rule.

The Civil Service System

Because of different colonial or historical experiences, the central and other personnel agencies of the five Southeast Asian nations covered in this study have varying civil service systems. The differences in form notwithstanding, there are certain commonalities which may be noted. It is perhaps through these commonalities that western influences are felt most.

Table 2 shows the temporal gap between the political independence of the Asian countries covered in this study and the time their central personnel agencies were instituted. It will be noted that the public personnel agencies of these countries evolved over various points in their history. Thus, Indonesia which became independent in 1945 had its first personnel agency instituted in 1952, in contrast to the Philippine experience where the creation of the present Civil Service Commission was provided for even before it gained its independence from the United States in 1946. In the case of Malaysia and Singapore, there were provisions for the creation of the personnel agency upon independence even as changes in that system were introduced much later.

What is the significance of the dates of establishment of the central personnel agencies? While continuing changes have been introduced in these agencies as problems are discerned over time, it can be said that the basic principles and philosophy underlying the creation of these agencies would be more susceptible to colonial influence if these were organized under or during the tutelage of the colonial power. On the other hand, it is more likely that agencies which were organized sometime after independence would have given more

Table 2. Independence Dates and Institutions of Central Personnel Agencies of Selected Southeast Asian Countries*

<i>Nation</i>	<i>Independence Date</i>	<i>Central Personnel Agency</i>
Indonesia	1945	Institute of Public Personnel Administration (created in 1972 superseded earlier by a body created in 1952)
Malaysia	1957	Federal Establishment Office/ Public Services Department (PSD) (1957) Judicial and Legal Services Commission Public Services Commission Police Force Commission Railway Service Commission Educational Services Commission
Singapore	1965	Public Service Commission (1951)
Philippines	1945	Civil Service Commission (1935)
Thailand		Civil Service Commission (1928) Judicial Service Commission (1934) Teachers Council (1945) Universities Officials Commission (1959) Public Prosecutor Service Commission (1960) Provincial Administration Commission (1960) Municipality Officials' Commission (1967) Bangkok Metropolitan Officials Commission (1973) Legislative Body Officials Commission (1975) Police Officials Commission (1978)

*Source: Amara Raksasataya and Heinrich Siedentopf (eds.), *Asian Civil Services: Developments and Trends* (Kuala Lumpur: Asian and Pacific Development and Administration Center, 1980).

thought to local needs and practices which may be best incorporated in and considered functional for their system.

In the case of the Philippines, for instance, the 1881 assassination of Unites States President James A. Garfield by a disgruntled job-seeker who failed to get an appointment to the position he aspired for, was related to the strong anti-spoils provision included in Public Act No. 5 creating the Philippine Civil Service. This feature of the Philippine civil service system is incorporated in all of the basic laws passed on the Philippine civil service since then.³⁰

Aside from providing information on the years of establishment of the major personnel agencies of five Southeast Asian countries, Table 2 also reveals that public personnel administration in these countries is not carried out in one unified system. Thailand, the only country which has not been under colonial rule,

sought and was greatly exposed to British and American influence. It felt the earliest need for a central personnel agency which was created in 1928. While this commission was originally a unified system, it was differentiated into ten distinct commissions to serve separate services, the latest of these being the Commission for Police Officials. Malaysia, likewise has five other commissions for specific services aside from the Public Services Department.³¹ It is also worthwhile to note that in most of these countries, there is one major central personnel agency and other units and agencies which assist these central bodies in the performance of personnel functions. Singapore, for instance, has two offices which assist the Public Service Commission, the Personnel Administration Branch of the Budget Division of the Ministry of Finance and the Establishment Unit of the Prime Minister's Office.³²

Beyond the structure, the dynamics of three particular personnel processes, through which adoption and adaptation of Western influences are likely evident, are examined. These are recruitment and selection, personnel classification, and training. These processes serve to insure the application of the merit system.

Recruitment and Selection. Recruitment and selection for the public service usually covers the following stages: "discovery and cultivation of the best employment market for the positions involved, use of attractive recruitment literature and adequate publicity, employment of up-to-date test of high selectivity and reliability, adequate search for candidates from within the service, a placement program that puts the right man in the right job and a follow-up probationary program as an integral part of the selection process."³³

A number of factors may determine the specific recruitment policies of a country. Among these would be the way "public service" is defined by the constitution and other laws passed for this purpose, i.e., determining the scope and jurisdiction of the personnel agencies; the career system adopted by the country, i.e., whether it employs the "closed" or the "open" career system; and the classification scheme adopted. Under the "closed" system, entry is usually at the lower level because the upper ranks is reserved for those already in the service. The "open" career system, on the other hand, permits entrance at any level with each category prescribing set qualifications and entrance requirements.

Table 3 presents the career and classification schemes of the five countries covered in this study. It is interesting to note that while it is only Malaysia which still follows the British heritage of a "closed" concept, at least two of the countries have adopted modified forms of the rank and position classification schemes to complement the career system implemented for public servants.

Even with these differences in the career and classification schemes of the five countries, all of them subscribe initially to the merit principle. Indonesia's constitution thus provides that "the recruitment of civilian public servants

Table 3. Career System and Classification Scheme of Southeast Asian Countries

<i>Country</i>	<i>Career System</i>	<i>Classification Scheme</i>
Indonesia	Open	Combination of Rank and Position Classification
Malaysia	Closed	Rank Classification
Philippines	Open	Position Classification
Singapore	Open	Combination of Rank and Position Classification
Thailand	Open	Position Classification (as of 1975).

must be based purely on objective requirement already stipulated and may not be based on religion, group or region."³⁴ In the same manner, the Malaysian constitution provides that except as expressly authorized by it, there should be no discrimination against any citizen "on the ground only of religion, race, descent or place of birth in the appointment to any office or employment under a public authority."³⁵ The Philippine Constitution also stipulates that "appointment in the Civil Service except as to those which are policy-determining, primarily confidential or highly technical in nature are made only according to merit and fitness to be determined as practicable by competitive examination."³⁶

Beyond these characteristics of the personnel system, however, there are greater societal factors that closely impinge on the implementation of the merit system. These are: (1) the view that government should employ certain sectors in society that might not otherwise get gainful employment elsewhere; (2) the strong particularistic ties among the people which put value on kinship, geographic affinities and personal friendship over competence and personal qualifications; (3) the complaint that there are less qualified personnel who can fill up the additional positions created to handle the new tasks assumed by government; and (4) the heterogenous ethnic composition of some of the new developing states.

The influence and interplay of these factors are analyzed and related to trends and development in Asian civil service. Post independence experiences which highlight the problems in the implementation of the merit principle was indicative of the need for introducing "adaptations" to gear the thinking behind this principle to local culture and beliefs.

Indigenization of the bureaucracy right after independence essentially meant the hiring of nationals of the new sovereign state to replace expatriates. In Singapore, the transfer of the government from the hands of the colonial masters to the local population was also otherwise known as "localization." As a consequence of the local civil servants' agitation for parity with the British on conditions of service and related aspects, subordinate services which were created especially for locals were abolished. Thereafter, local peo-

ple satisfying the necessary requirements were appointed directly for posts in the administrative and other services.³⁷ To devote systematic attention to this problem, a localization commission was established in Singapore in 1955. This body was to set up datelines for which various services could be localized. To achieve this objective, supernumerary positions were established, local officials were promoted to senior positions and, to some extent, recruitment criteria were modified to accommodate the smaller pool of locally available expertise.³⁸

In countries where the colonial power had not laid the foundation for this turnover, the transition has been relatively more difficult. This dilemma was felt in Malaysia where the Malays were not given access to English-medium schools as the education policy provided that Malays should study in Malay-medium schools at the primary level. On the argument that the Malays were more at ease and independent in their agricultural pursuit, the learning of English was seen as an inducement for them to abandon their interest in this field.³⁹ To make up for the short supply of English-educated Malays for government jobs, the Malay College of Kuala Kangsar was especially established for the education of Malays who belonged to known families and for the training of Malay boys for admission to certain branches of government service.⁴⁰ Graduates of this school were admitted to the Malay Administration Service (MAS), a service lower than the Malay Civil Service (MCS), which was created especially for Malays. Very few members of the MAS managed to get to the MCS. The low number of Malay recruits into the MCS was justified by the fact that the Malay officials were recruited with lower qualifications than their British counterparts and therefore must be prepared to face a severe practical test before their promotion into the MCS.⁴¹

The American colonial policy in the Philippines, unlike that of the British, was designed to allow the Filipinos a progressively increasing share in the colonial government.⁴² With extended greater access to such social services as education, health and sanitation, and communication and transportation, the Filipinos benefitted from a relatively liberal American colonial policy. Filipinization was the basic administrative policy of the colonial government. No less than the Director of the Bureau of Civil Service clearly declared that "no position should be filled by Americans when competent and reliable Filipinos are available."⁴³

It must be pointed out, however, that the greater force which prompted the Filipinization of the American colonial civil service was its ability to maintain a core of permanent American administrators in the island. By 1905, the first Filipino graduates of the English language public school system were recruited to the civil service. The Filipinization process came in full swing with the steady increase of Filipino appointments and the decrease of American officials and employees from 1908 to 1930.⁴⁴

With the increasing participation and control given to local citizens, the civil service of the colonized Southeast Asian nations became increasingly

infused with local values. This localization process was accelerated until the bureaucracy came under the full control of the natives with political independence. By then, the bureaucracy had to contend with the dilemma of economic growth and political stabilization, and more importantly, to take an active part in forging a national identity. Although this was not the task of the bureaucracy alone, it had a greater role to play considering that other political institutions were still evolving at this time.

The departure of the colonial masters necessitated the employment of more local civil servants. In some countries which were under British rule, recruitment to the civil service was initially limited to the highly educated nationals who belonged to the elite society. With the slow lifting of controls and accompanying sanctions imposed by the colonizers, socio-cultural forces which were inhibited by the imposition of colonial rules came into full play. These forces centered inevitably around the public civil service which emerged as one of the power centers in the society.

Their exposure to long Western control notwithstanding, the developing countries were still essentially traditional societies exhibiting characteristics of early modernization. Riggs aptly describes this type of societies as one where the new and the old exist side by side and where the bureaucratic system gives a false impression of autonomy, when in fact it is deeply enmeshed in and molded by older and traditional social, economic, religious and political systems.⁴⁵

In a traditional society where there is heavy reliance on the traditional ruler, leader or the head of the family for support, major social change is required before members of this society will desist from viewing the government as the institution which must assume the responsibility to take care of its people by providing them jobs which they need but they may not be qualified for. Also, jobs which are prestigious and are more financially rewarding than those offered by government must be available to those who seek them.

Since the economy has yet to pick up from its colonial levels, opportunities for employment outside the public sector tended to be limited even as the demand for them increased. Because of the status attached to government positions, the demand for them increased way ahead of supply. For this reason, personnel relationships figured more prominently as a factor bearing on job seeking processes with the job-seeker tending to rely on patrons to help them land jobs. The closer the relationship between the patron and the job seeker, the greater was the likelihood that stronger influence will be exerted to reach a decision in favor of the latter.

The dilemma which confronted the new nations at this time was essentially that of providing employment to deserving nationals while at the same time ensuring that only those who are qualified are employed in the civil service. The clamor for more competent civil servants was also an articulation of the desire to have enough administrators to replace the expatriates.

Within the context of these realities, the adaptation or indigenization of the merit principle underlying the recruitment process came either in the form of having a sponsor to support a qualified applicant who meets the minimum requirement or requesting relatives or friends in the bureaucracy to expedite or facilitate favorable action on job applicants. Distinction, however, must be made between the higher political bodies which have formal power over the bureaucracy as against those who are within the bureaucracy. This is important to note since more than political patronage, inherent in these transactions is the flavor of traditional relationships.

Although clearly antithetical to the precept of the merit system, nepotism continued to flourish in the post independence states as it was maintained by sociological conditions. O.D. Corpuz in his account of the history and development of the Philippine bureaucracy described these conditions, thus:

Filipino families before the war, as they are now were large and close knit groups. Membership was based on consanguinity as well as on affinity. Membership in these groups as a rule involved the duty of members to help each other in a multifarious variety of ways. Successful members, whether in the field of business or private profession, or politics were under obligation, (and) seldom shirked, to extend aid to less successful relatives. The assistance would be in the form of loans or outright money gifts or the taking in of the relative . . . or if one occupied an influential public position, seeing that the relative was placed on a government job.⁴⁶

In Thailand, where prior to the establishment of training institution, recruitment was originally based on ascriptive criteria and by personal favor of the King, recruitment and promotion of Thai bureaucrats continued to be a function of both favoritism and merit.⁴⁷ The entrenched and pervasive concern for favoritism resulted in the development of a local vocabulary which suggest such terms as "going through the back door" and "good at licking."

The merit system has not been completely debunked in Thailand. Promotion and movement across certain grades could also depend on the civil servants' ability or talent. Thais with foreign (notably Western) training are considered to be more competent than those trained locally.

The bureaucrats' reconciliation of these two seemingly competing norms is manifested in the results of a survey of 300 public officials who participated in a training course at the National Institute of Development Administration. A high 95 percent of the respondents believed that professional advancement in the bureaucracy depended on patron-client relationship while 93 percent also thought that it depended on knowledge and ability.⁴⁸ These findings support the fact that both norms continue to influence decisions on recruitment and promotion in the bureaucracy. To the public officials, professional advancement depended on a combination of two factors: personal relationships and knowledge and ability.

The Philippine experience in adapting the merit principle to local conditions is vividly captured in a case documenting the process of recruiting new

members to the Philippine civil service.⁴⁹ This case highlights an informal agreement between the President and the members of Lower House of Congress on how new positions in the budget maybe allocated between these two political bodies. A western writer has referred to it as an "amusing account of an effort to rationalize spoil."⁵⁰

The "50-50" agreement, as the case was titled, portrays how members of Congress, after an undisclosed consultation with the President, asked heads of executive department to give preference to qualified applicants who are screened and recommended by their congressmen. Congress sought this favor from the administrators after hinting at the possibility of their being more cooperative in the agency's budget hearings if the administrators cooperate with their plan.

When the plan came to the knowledge of a member of Senate, it was immediately denounced in a press conference. The Chairman of Senate Committee on Finance said:

The 50-50 Plan is immoral and no different from the spoil system. It reduces the budget to an instrument of patronage. . . . The new jobs in the budget to be allocated to political recommendees under the 50-50 Plan belong only to qualified civil service eligibles, regardless of whether or not they have political backers. What will happen to people who possess the highest qualifications but who do not know any congressman? Employment in the public service must depend on fitness for office in accordance with certain qualifications as provided for in civil service laws and integrity, loyalty and dedication to the public good.⁵¹

Two bureau directors who were interviewed on the plan saw nothing wrong in accommodating the political protegees if they met the minimum qualifications for the position. One director commented: "What's wrong with having congressmen recommend if their recommendees are qualified and eligible? . . . we tell congressmen quite frankly that we cannot accept their recommendees if they don't have the necessary qualifications and eligibility. We make decisions here and not all of the recommendations of congressmen are accepted." Another administrator who admitted using the 50-50 plan in filling up new positions said: "I think one advantage of the plan is that positions in the field can now be filled from among the inhabitants of the province who are recommended by the congressmen who represent it, unlike before when the department secretary even appoints field men from among his provincemates."

Six months after the effectivity of the plan, figures of the Special Screening Committee of the House of Representatives showed that some 400 of 1,000 recommendations made by members of the House and endorsed by the Committee were favorably acted on. While the case was played up in the dailies, the furor over the Malacañang-Congress agreement completely died down. The people, seeing it as a mere formalization of what was regarded as an accepted and widely used practice, never moved or acted collectively against it.

The Thai and the Philippine cases cited above indicate the adaptations that these societies made to accommodate the merit principle without sacri-

ficing the strong personalistic and patriarchal system that prevails in society, the people's expectations of government and the government's need for eligible, qualified and competent manpower for its public service.

The case of ethnic representation in the bureaucracy is most relevant to societies like Malaysia which because of its ethnic composition has a bureaucracy composed of distinct and incomparable cultural groups with widely varying values. Puthuchery sees the Malaysian bureaucracy as having for its foundation "deep-seated values which have not been modified or abandoned despite the adoption of modern bureaucratic structures. The saliency of ethnic values over bureaucratic values creates a style of administrative behavior that is highly politicized despite the formal acceptance of a career system of administration based on a high degree of formalism and freedom from political interference."⁵²

The priority given by the British to Malays for appointment to the Malaysian Civil Service formed part of the effort to bring about rapid Malayanization of the public service. Administrative and semi-professional positions were easily filled by Malay officials but when there were insufficient qualified Malay personnel, Chinese and Indians were recruited.⁵³ The 4:1 quota system adopted in favor of the Malays, is unique because it favors the largest ethnic group in the country which is also the most economically backward. More significantly, the quota system ensured not just adequate representation but also the dominance of this group in the services in which the quota system is applicable. This ratio assured the Malays of at least 80 percent of the positions in the Malaysian Civil Service.

The politically controversial quota system was a short-term measure designed to allow the Malays more time to make up for their loss of educational opportunities in the past. It has been criticized as allowing selection on the basis of ascriptive factors rather than on a more objective selection based on qualifications and professional experience.⁵⁴

The representatives of the civil service in conditions of social heterogeneity as in the case of Malaysia is an area of concern for the other nations as well. Where there is a wide discrepancy between the availability and accessibility of universal education in a language acceptable to all, then the bureaucracy tends to be composed only of the elite of the society. Being colonial legacies, the bureaucracy tended to be composed of the more highly educated members of society.

As it is, given the requirements of bureaucratic structure, it is extremely unlikely that it will ever be representative of the society. Cariño⁵⁵ hypothesized that this may be due to the following reasons:

- (1) Certain patterns arise because of the requirement of a bureaucratic organization for an educated and urbanized staff;
- (2) Representation in a merit bureaucracy is conditioned by the availa-

bility of and access of people to schools and places of work. Minorities deprived access to these facilities may be disqualified because of the operation of the merit principle;

(3) Bias against minorities may be maintained by requiring higher qualifications. Thus, their representation may be assured only at certain levels of the bureaucracy; and

(4) The dominance of a certain group may be manifested in the cultural norms of personalism and ascriptiveness with administrators giving preference to those related to them in various ways during recruitment and/or promotion.

If by adaptation of western practices is meant the modification of borrowed institutions to better gear them to local needs, culture and realities, then the instances described from various Southeast Asian nations constitute a form of adaptation of the merit principle in the recruitment and selection of members of the civil service. With the imposed bureaucratic structure, indigenization of the civil service came more explicitly in the form of employing more nationals. Beyond this, however, the adaptation of the merit principle came in the form of (1) accommodating the social values such as, family obligations, reciprocity of personal favors and other particularistic and ascriptive ways together with the impersonal-formal relationship required, (2) the use of persons in power to acquire favors from government, and (3) the institutionalization of priorities for ethnic representation when this is necessary to preserve national identity.

Personnel Classification. Personnel classification is an integral part of the personnel process that has adopted the merit system in Southeast Asian countries. Considered the indispensable *sine qua non* of an efficiently administered personnel program, a personnel classification scheme forms the basis for the foundation of a rational promotion system.⁵⁶

Among the Southeast Asian countries, Malaysia follows the rank classification scheme; the Philippines and more recently, Thailand use the position classification system. Both Indonesia and Singapore have tried to work out a combination of both systems.

Of the five countries, data on the evolution of the Philippine and the Thai position classification plans are available. It is mainly for this reason that the experience of these two countries in adapting the U.S.-inspired position classification scheme to needs dictated by the availability of local resources and the demands of local culture is described.

Patterned after the U.S. Classification Act of 1923, the Philippine Salary Standardization Law was passed in 1938. The system set by this law was considered unsatisfactory due to the lack of reliable data on duties and responsibilities and the unavailability of qualified personnel.⁵⁷ In 1951, a committee surveyed and made an analysis of positions and salaries of both public and

private sectors.⁵⁸ In 1953, the U.S. Philippine Technical Assistance Program made funds available for the services of the U.S. consultancy firm, Louis Kroeger and Associates, to develop a position classification and compensation plan for all civil service positions in the national government.

The approval of the contract led to the organization of the Wage and Position Classification Office (WAPCO), a new unit under the Budget Commission. Staff members of this unit were trained intensively in the U.S. under the technical assistance programs. Impressed with what they observed, these staff members came back determined to adopt pay and classification materials from the U.S. Civil Service Commission.

When the Classification and Pay Plan was finally prepared, a Filipino staff member posed major objections to the American consultant on the number of classes. Despite his objections, the latter's view prevailed.

These plans were adopted in 1957 when they were promulgated by the executive order which formally established the implementing details for the position classification and pay plans, with the salary scales to be gradually adopted over a three-year period.

The WAPCO plan had already been in force for a year but the criticism leveled against it was already so extensive. Agency heads, for example, complained that their prerogatives to assess the value of the duties and responsibilities of positions in terms of overall functions and objectives of their agency were unduly undermined. They contended that some subordinate positions have been allocated higher salary ranges than some ranking positions. There were also complaints that some agencies had been specially favored by the WAPCO plan and that coursing papers through the WAPCO unnecessarily delayed their processing. More significantly, Congress felt that WAPCO had taken away their power to set salaries.

The anti-WAPCO sentiment was so pervasive that the Lower House of Congress attempted to abolish the agency through an appropriation bill. While this bill did not push through, Congress enacted another law which abolished the geographic differential of the WAPCO pay plan.

Another legal development which precipitated more problems for WAPCO was an opinion issued by the Secretary of Justice in 1967 reversing the decision of his predecessors by ruling that employees of government corporations performing proprietary functions could bargain collectively with management on all aspects of labor management relations including salaries and wages. As a consequence of this ruling, ten government corporations were exempted from WAPCO coverage. This in turn led to the spiralling of salaries within these corporations. With these developments, the dictum "equal pay for equal work," the very philosophy underlying the WAPCO plan, became more of an illusion than a reality.

The exemption of government corporations and certain agencies from the WAPCO was followed by some agencies who succeeded in having special laws passed excluding them from the WAPCO pay plan.

When the Executive proposed to place all positions with the executive branch of the national government, including all government corporations, a number of institutions protested against the bill. As a result of these protestations, the bill was not passed.

With the major reorganization of the Philippine Government in 1970, a technical panel to review the existing classification and compensation plan of the government was constituted. While specific recommendations were offered by this panel to the President, these recommendations were not acted upon until 1975 when a new Commissioner of the Budget was appointed. A new WAPCO plan was approved as part of the Budgetary Reform Decree on Compensation and Position Classification of 1976. The decree changed the name of the Wage and Position Classification Office (WAPCO) to Office of Compensation and Position Classification (OCPC).⁵⁹

The experience of Thailand when it shifted from the rank classification to the position classification system in 1975 closely paralleled that of the Philippines. In its first Civil Service Act passed in 1928, Thailand adopted a rank classification system. When its monarchical government was transformed to a constitutional regime in 1932, a new civil service act was promulgated in 1933. The 1933 act introduced the principle of position classification in the Thai Civil Service for the first time. This change was short-lived, however, since the 1933 act was replaced by the 1936 Civil Service Act. One of the reasons for this move was that the new position classification and open competitive examination caused confusion and anxiety over civil servants' future career expectations. Moreover, there was a strong emotional effect on civil servants whose ranks were abolished. The 1936 Civil Service Act provided numerous changes in the foundation of personnel administration practices. It retained the administrative positions while at the same time re-established the rank concept. With these changes, the system became a mixture of the rank and position concept with the former given more preference.⁶⁰

By the early sixties, Thailand felt the need for administrative reform. At about this time, the Thai Civil Service learned that position classification and other modern personnel techniques were being practised successfully in certain institutions in the United States. Acting on this information, the Commission then contacted and received enthusiastic support from the United States Operations Division which in turn requested the California State Board to assist the Civil Service Commission of Thailand on the establishment of a modern civil service system. Thus, the "Project for Civil Service Improvement in Thailand" was implemented contracting the services of the California State Personnel Board for a 6-year period covering the period June 1965 to June 1971.⁶¹

Personnel analysts of the Thai Civil Service were trained on modern classification and job evaluation techniques. By mid-1968, advisory staff from the California State Personnel Board and the Thai Staff in the project had covered 48,000 positions in the central area and provinces and had also audited 3,700 positions. The plan was piloted at the Office of the Civil Service Commission in 1971. In 1975, a new Civil Service Act was passed authorizing the Civil Service Commission to classify approximately 120,000 positions in one year.⁶²

Positive and negative effects of the installation of the new system were felt. The positive arguments were noted by two foreign sources. Edward McCrensky noted that:

The new position classification system installed in September 1975 represents a major change in the organization, staffing, job structure and pay policies of the government. For the first time, a basis was now provided for strengthening other selected major areas of governmental personnel administration.⁶³

A World Bank Report also commended the move,

Two prerequisites for the further mobilization of personnel administration and staff development had recently been introduced at the initiative of the Civil Service Commission. The first was the replacement of the previous very arbitrary system of classifying civil servants for purposes of salary and other benefits according to personnel rank and regardless of qualifications or responsibilities by a modern system of uniform position classification based on an objective assessment of job contents. . . . The second major change was the enactment in 1975 of the new Civil Service Act. Many institutional difficulties will only be resolved by the gradual evolution and modernization of civil service and personnel administration since these condition the behavior and attitudes of officials as well as effect the efficiency of all public sector agencies involved in development.⁶⁴

The negative effects of the installation of the new system were felt by the bureaucracy itself. Having been deeply immersed in the rank in man concept which finds basis on the *Sakdina* system, an indigenous practice where rank was quantitatively measured by status units in terms of land and where the *Sakdina* ranking determines the status, power and privileges,⁶⁵ the new system created a new set of hierarchical relationships in the Thai Civil Service. As a result of the conversion of the five echelons of bureaucracy to eleven, civil servants who had the same status were differentiated to various levels.

The installation of the plan also became an opportunity for civil servants to be appointed to higher status even if this was undeserved. The limited time available to the Thai Civil Service Commission had caused another serious problem. Job evaluation and classification were done without the participation of the operating agencies. Due to its emphasis on job content, the new classification system requires far too many competitive promotional examinations. Finally, even during the course of operating the new position classification system, an excessive number of employees submitted requests to the Civil Service Commission for the reclassification of jobs recently allocated. These requests were not only disruptive of the work normally performed by the classification analyst; the delays of official action gave rise to suspicion among

officials of the intent of the Civil Service Commission and generated resentment among employees towards the position classification system and the Civil Service Commission.⁶⁶

The problems cited above suggest the kind of adaptations that were made by these two countries in their attempt to maximize use of modern personnel techniques which have not been fully studied before they were adopted by their governments. While it may have functioned well in developed countries where work specialization is supported by trained professionals and administrators and are understood fully by bureaucrats as the basis for operation and thus may be cited as an example of a management technique that is successful in industrial countries, personnel classification was adopted without fully examining its relevance to local conditions and the realities of underdevelopment.

Adaptation came in the form of loosening up the rigidities and centralization that came with the implementation of the plan, adjusting the compensation level to what the government can reasonably afford given limited resources, trying to combine the position classification with rank concept if this will ensure acceptability and constant dialogue between the agency and the unit implementing the plan.

In analyzing the stresses and difficulties met in adopting the WAPCO plan, Samonte called for the agents of reform to determine the necessary adaptations or innovations when introducing changes:

External influence—in this case, the pervasive influence of American technical advisers—is thus another factor to consider. The preliminary classification and salary surveys were made upon the suggestion of the American civil service specialist of USOM/Philippines. The hiring of a private management consulting firm was certainly American-supported and inspired. And there is ample evidence to show that the classification and pay plans reflect the preferences, if not biases, of the American consultants, a majority of whom were most familiar with the California state classification system. Unfortunately, the Filipino analysts, except for a very few, did not feel competent or experienced enough to question the assumptions of their American counterparts. In the absence of "countervailing forces," whether local or foreign technicians with different perspectives, it is not surprising that the WAPCO plans were closely patterned after the California system. With 2,300 (now around 3,000) classes with 75 salary ranges, providing five percent intervals between salary steps and between the corresponding steps of consecutive salary ranges, there was a tendency toward "scientism"—a valiant but vain effort at mechanical precision. The plans were thus characterized by too much rigidity which led to inequities in some specific cases.⁶⁷

Training. Recognizing the limited capability of the members of the civil service and the need to continuously upgrade the competence of the bureaucracy to deal with complex problems generated by the concern for social and economic development, most, if not all of the countries in the Southeast Asian region placed a premium on training.

The value of training to developing countries has been stressed for certain reasons. First, their educational facilities are limited. This means that pre-

service training may be inadequate. Second, the urgency of the work of national development requires that the slow traditional method of on-the-job learning or apprenticeship be accelerated. A training program facilitates the learning process and thus brings the civil servants, including new recruits, to satisfactory standard of performance in a relatively shorter time. Third, the changing nature of the civil service is in itself a compelling reason for formal training. Finally, formal training is the only reliable way for the public administrators of developing countries to learn management skills.⁶⁸

Responsibility for training in Malaysia is given to the National Institute of Public Administration. Better known for its Malay acronym INTAN, it was conceived in 1969 and created in 1972. Envisioned to be a development-oriented institute, it has two basic aims: (1) to be able to foster innovative behavior and to transform ideas into action, and (2) to function as a conduit through which governmental policies and programs can reach their ultimate beneficiaries.⁶⁹ Training as undertaken by INTAN is conceptualized in two perspectives. The first view sees training as important to the solution of internal management problems to meet demands for productivity. The second viewpoint sees training as vital to the solution of external problems by enabling the organizations to gain more understanding and appreciation of the environment's totality and of the impact of implementation of public policies on this environment.

In the Philippines, training for civil servants is conducted by a number of public and private institutions. Aside from the different ministries which have their own training units, training for civil servants at various levels is conducted by the Civil Service Academy, the Postal Training Institute, the Foreign Service Institute, the Local Government Center and the Administrative Development Center of the UP College of Public Administration, the Philippine Executive Academy, and the Development Academy of the Philippines.

The Philippines' policy on training is articulated in Section 28, Article VIII of Presidential Decree No. 807; thus,

The development and selection of a competent and efficient work force in the public service is a primary concern of government. It shall be the policy of government that a continuing program of career and personnel development be established for all government employees at all levels. An integrated national plan for career and personnel development shall serve as the basis for all career and personnel development activities in government.⁷⁰

The Civil Service Commission is tasked with the function of conducting and integrating training in the public service. To fulfill this responsibility, the Commission, utilizing a combination of the centralized and decentralized approaches, prepared an Integrated Training System that seeks to rationalize and define clear-cut responsibilities to ensure continuing and balanced attention to all sectors of the civil service, reduce the duplication effort to a minimum and optimize the utilization of scarce training resources.⁷¹

Unlike Malaysia and the Philippines, Thailand has no systematic centralized manpower or human resource planning agency which gives attention to training until recently.⁷² While formal policy declaring the need for training was articulated as early as 1957, it was only in 1976 that the Thai Council of Ministries approved the establishment of a "Planning and Coordinating Center for Civil Service Training" which was attached to the Division of Standards and Development Office of the Civil Service Commission.⁷³ The creation of this body was expected to minimize or solve the negative consequences of the lack of a definite and continuous national training policy. An outcome of this decision was the production in 1980 of a ten-year Training Plan for the office of the Civil Service Commission of Thailand prepared with the assistance of the United Nations Consultant under the "Government Employee Performance Improvement Programme" (Phase II). This document articulates the concern for skills training as well as the need to instill among civil servants the value of ethical behavior and positive attitude towards government service.

The Philippines and Malaysia have had considerable experience in providing training at different levels of the bureaucracy. While the initial years of the experience of the two countries have been focused on policy development and institution building for training, by this time, they are ready to adapt the content of their training programs to the critical areas of development administration. Beyond internal management, the more difficult and critical aspect of training that must be developed is the interface between the bureaucrat and the people.

Having focused on the concerns of productivity, institution building and development, the bigger question that confronts the trainers is what all these training programs should ultimately be for. The inevitable answer is for the people. But having dwelt so much more on internal management process and operations, the civil service needs to reorient itself so that it can be "debureaucratized" and be better suited to react to the non-bureaucratic way by which people articulate their needs. Civil servants can deal best with the rural folks if they can empathize with their way of thinking and their way of life. They can only truly involve them and seek their participation in government projects if they understand how and why they want to participate at all.

To adapt training methodologies to these needs, a novel training technique was implemented in the Barrio Immersion Community Management Program (COMP) exercise of the Career Executive Service Development Program (CESDP) for higher civil servants conducted by the Development Academy of the Philippines.

The COMP cum barrio immersion portion of the CESDP is an intervention conceived by the Academy as its contribution to the people-government linkage required by the developmental thrusts of the government. The interaction

between the people and the government was simulated in a situation where the participants of the program, staying in the villages, try to serve as change agents while at the same time exposing themselves to the realities of rural life.

The barrio immersion as initially envisioned had three objectives. The first was to make the individual participants experience and appreciate the realities, constraints and opportunities found in rural communities. Through this exposure, they are expected to broaden their perspectives and develop the commitment to serve the disadvantaged sector through plans and programs that they would implement. The second objective was to assist the barrio people develop participative and problem solving skills and build capabilities for community self-reliance. Finally, it sought to forge a closer relationship between the government and the depressed areas to bring about a more efficient service delivery system.⁷⁴

Aside from the DAP, other training entities have tried their hand at this approach. The Civil Service Academy, for instance, has its rural immersion program,⁷⁵ while the Philippine Executive Academy conducts its village field exercise where executive-participants are to stay and live with the rural folk for at least five to seven days. The values and issues related to this approach were discussed in a workshop sponsored by the Management Education Council of the University of the Philippines in 1980. Among the questions raised were:

- (1) How effective is this approach in bringing about behavioral changes among the participants and the people in the rural areas?
- (2) How ethical is the practice of using the people as part of the training inputs for executive development?
- (3) What happens when specific plans of action are initiated and then are left unattended to when the participants leave the area?
- (4) How relevant are these exercises to the immediate needs of the people?
- (5) Does this methodology really develop self-reliance among the people?

There are yet no clear answers to these questions. What is meaningful, however, is that this approach highlights the willingness to test a "methodology" that relies largely on the abilities, good faith and commitment of the people—the village residents and the participants.⁷⁶

Central to the philosophy underlying this pilot methodology is the view that:

Development is a people-seeking process. If physical and social structures are sought by the people, rather than imposed upon a community, they would be actually accepted, processed and utilized by the people in the area. Development, then will not "happen" to a community. Rather, it will be effected by people who recognize that they have the capacity to mold a desired future, to take action as a community toward that goal.⁷⁷

A training program with this vision as conceived by the local civil servants is perhaps the ultimate indigenization for it is an effort undertaken by the people, produced by them and most importantly borne out of their concern and respect for themselves.

Rural Development Programs

An extensive discussion of the organizational structure and processes in the planning, implementation and evaluation of rural development programs provides evidence of the attempts by the developing countries to adapt public administration technology to their needs and cultural setting. Rural development was selected as a focus primarily because of the common problem facing the Southeast Asian countries, namely, accelerating development in the areas where a majority of the population is found. It is in the rural areas where the problem of poverty, inequality, severe malnutrition and low productivity is most acute and distressing. It is also in the rural areas where the penetration of colonial influence was weak, and thus, the traditional culture and institutions are still prevalent.

The Colonial Legacies. One of the significant contributions of the independence period was the institutionalization of rural development programs as an important component of the national development planning structure. The cases of Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines point to the preference for a top-down rural development policy, a carry-over of a highly centralized administrative structure from the colonial period into the independence era. Over-centralization led to the general isolation of rural communities, thereby inhibiting the grassroots population from active and meaningful participation in the planning and policy decision-making processes. A number of reasons help explain the centralizing policies of these countries in rural development. The legacy of colonial governments of Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines had to contend first with the problem of nationally integrating their archipelagic and multi-cultural societies. In the case of Indonesia, this issue was more a question of national survival after the Dutch left in 1947. The Dutch government might have developed and left to Indonesia a satisfactory central planning organization, but this did not extend to subnational levels. This may explain the general passivity and incapacity of intermediate or subnational levels to participate in efforts at national integration.

In the Philippines, the attainment of national unity towards self-government was a prerequisite for independence in 1946. To this effect, the 1935 Constitution provided for a strong executive as envisioned by the U.S. Brownlow Committee.⁷⁸ Similarly, a strong executive machinery was more attuned to Malaysia's dual problems of conflict management of its plural society and Communist guerilla movement.⁷⁹ At the extreme, rural development policies waived aside the Malay political demands for rural improvement in favor of winning the struggle against the communist insurgents as illustrated by the military operations of the Malaysian colonial government against Communist guerillas in the 1930's.

Another colonial legacy was the development of the national economy of these countries towards accommodating a politico-economic structure based

on Western capitalism and free enterprise exhibiting to a macro-economic planning orientation.

Aside from the orientation towards national integration and a macro-economic planning approach, a strong centralized top-down planning structure was pursued on the basis of the general lack of local resources or the low capability of local or subnational levels to articulate proposals to the center. Ironically in the case of Indonesia, which does not have as much problems with local manpower resources, the government policy emphasized the maintenance of a conservative top-down approach to planning.⁸⁰ In contrast, the Philippines' lack of local initiative was discernible from the prevailing over-dependence of local officials on the central government which, as a consequence, led to the general reluctance of the national leadership for a bottom-up change in rural development planning.

Similarly, the paucity of local resources in Malaysia, which was an offshoot of the British colonial policy of adhering to the indigenous framework of Malay society, hardly encouraged any attempt at administrative reforms in terms of instituting local participation in the implementation of development projects at the local (village) levels.⁸¹ By tradition, the indigenous Malay society which emphasized action from the top, together with the traditional political system which stressed control, was known for its invulnerability to change from the outside.⁸² This traditional system, based on the Muslim Sultanate, makes Malaysia's predilection for top-down planning strategy a unique one. Under the sultanate, the sultan was, and still is, the apex of the political system exercising the role of symbol and preserver of the unity of society (the State).

Like the Philippines, Indonesia and Malaysia, the rural development planning structure in Thailand followed the top-down approach. To a certain point, it was unique in its concern for the deconcentration of powers and planning functions of the central government to lower units of administration. Perhaps this uniqueness can be explained by the fact that, unlike the other Southeast Asian countries, Thailand had never been under colonial regimes. The approach to the process of deconcentration, which marked Thailand's shift from absolute monarchy to a constitutional monarchical form of government in 1933, involved the use of indigenous structures and values to change the traditional politico-economic system. This arises from the fact that the constitutional monarchy system was embedded in the Thai rich non-colonial or pre-modern bureaucracy that emphasized the central objective of social control throughout the country.⁸³

While Thailand shares with the other Southeast Asian countries its hierarchical bureaucracy under a strong centralized Royal Thai authority based in the capital city of Bangkok, the bureaucratic system was also unique because it operated largely to serve and promote social order. In Thailand, state and society are viewed as unitary and homogenous thus making state

policy uniform in application throughout the country. In the modern Thai administrative apparatus inherited from its monarchical predecessor, the *tambon* (village) government units influenced general well-being in outlying rural areas, promoting rural development by providing services and improving rural people's access to development resources. The role of local government organizations was given greater emphasis because it was based on traditional patterns of government. Characteristically, the traditional process of governance followed a personalized organizational arrangement which continues to be an integral element of the Thai bureaucracy. In all the different administrative levels, from the central administration to the provincial territorial and down to the lowest local development units, individuals occupying different status positions participated in the formulation and implementation of decisions within the framework of personal patron-client relationships. The participatory process gave the system an inherent capacity to adjust to some changes without recourse to external influences. For example, Western values and rapid urban expansion were perceived as potential threats to social order and stability.

As a whole, the strengthening of the local administrative units and the promotion of participation of individuals in the decision-making and implementation process, gave an overall picture of the Royal Thai government's interest in giving grassroot population opportunities for progress through service expansion in the rural villages. This concern for serving the rural people and accelerating the expansion of services to them was formally instituted (under the influence of USAID) with the creation in 1955 of a Community Development (CD) program under the sponsorship of the Ministry of Interior in simultaneous coordination with the Ministries of Agriculture, Education and Health.⁸⁴ On further observation, however, the CD program reduced the informal rural participatory aspect because program coordination and policy planning took place only at the highest levels, coupled with insufficient authority to enforce decisions at the lowest administrative levels.⁸⁵

Taken as a whole, rural development programs in Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand generally were not planned as comprehensively as in recent years.

The post-independence period, particularly the decade of the 50's and the 60's, provided the occasion for rethinking the goals of rural development and the strategies and organizational scheme for attaining the same. Consequent to the unresponsive and corrupt colonial bureaucracies of Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines, the issue of rural development in all three countries occupied a central place in the set of priorities of national development plans. The general policy shared by these countries was the maintenance of a strong strain of paternalism and ameliorative concern for rural development in terms of not radically disrupting the then existing rural socio-political structure.

Both internal and external forces played a part in this rethinking process. Manifestations of this were attempts to quell the racial riots in Malaysia which erupted as an aftermath of the May 1968 election, the Communist insurgency in the Philippines in the late '40s and the early '50s, and the political instability and Communist guerilla movement in Indonesia during the regime of Sukarno which preceded the abortive coup in 1965. Similar problems like growing insurgency and political disintegration were also occurring in Thailand.

In Malaysia, even before the pre-independence election in 1955, a change from benign colonial neglect to active government intervention in rural development was already evident. Immediately after independence in 1959, Tun Razak mounted a campaign to modernize the civil service, with special interest on speeding up the implementation of rural development programs and projects. The task initially required the reformation of the old ways of the colonial bureaucracy that generally impeded the effective administration of rural development. Faced with structural and personnel problems, Tun Razak had to decide among several alternatives. The first alternative was to change the structure of government and create a unitary state so that massive economic development programs could be initiated from the center without interference from the local provincial authorities. This was, however, politically difficult, as the British learned when they tried to create the Malaysian Union in 1946. Second was replacement of the traditional aristocratic bureaucrats with dedicated and politically inspired rural leaders. Again, this was practically impossible with the paucity of local resources. Besides, the national political leaders themselves were part of the traditional bureaucracy and their party was not revolutionary but reformist. Third was the adaptation of a third structure and personnel within the existing political framework with marginal improvements in the system through the intervention of the Ford Foundation in 1963 to explore further opportunities for administrative reforms in Malaysia. Under the recommendation of John Montgomery and Milton Esman of Harvard University who were hired by the Ford Foundation, a program of action was initiated departing from the post-British colonial administration.⁸⁶ The main concern was the formal adoption of a bottom-up planning and decision-making in the aggregation of grassroots level demands introduced in 1960.⁸⁷

The general tone of the recommendation contained a macro-economic plan for administrative reforms suggesting the adoption of the conventional U.S. model of free enterprise and, in particular, the extension concept in rural development. The baseline for reforms took various forms: the paternalistic attitude or the ameliorative approach of the central government to rural development, rapid social mobilization especially the introduction of new technologies, and infrastructure changes to rural environment and maximization of agricultural growth. These reforms were done through adaptations in the administrative machinery at the district and village levels, especially in the promotion of rural institutions as mechanisms and instrumentalities for

aggregating ground level demands and mobilizing rural participation in development planning and implementation activities.⁸⁸

In the case of Indonesia, administrative reforms also included some major changes in development planning, particularly in rural development, following the abortive coup in 1965 that ushered in the "new order" government of Suharto. The new government brought greater discipline in planning, control of management, and evaluation of results of rural development programs and projects. Aside from its significant impact in planning policy changes, the political upheaval of that period saw the emergence of a reformist element of voluntary organizations and functional groups (minority of technocrats in the political arena) which actively supported the establishment of a new bureaucratic mobilization against the "mixed bureaucrats-political parties" of the past colonial regimes. The new mobilizational system actively sought to integrate in the planning process the village people with the national administrative network to achieve the goal of "community solidarity" through the institution of the *desa* (village) government. To this effect, the government made it a policy to keep out party politics at the sub-national and national levels to ensure local level participation in the development efforts in the rural areas. The policy was formulated in recognition of the destructive role of political parties whose personalistic, parochial and self-serving interests significantly deprived the rural masses of opportunities to organize themselves for greater voice and participation in the village and sub-regional policy making. In great measure, the "new order" government sought to redefine the nature of rural participation as it related to the development process.

With production as the prime objective of rural development programs, however, the attendant conferring of power to the higher bureaucracy and hierarchical chains of top-down command (national, regional, district, village) still governed the planning structure with respect to mobilizing peasants' support and participation in the government's development effort. This was evident in the subordinate role of village officials within the village affairs where their power emanated from above and from the higher echelons of the public bureaucracy, rather than from below and among the rural populace.⁸⁹ In the lowest village level, the *lurah* (village head) might have assumed a pivotal role in the village by having access to most development funds and the discretion over the allocation of funds. Yet the position of *lurah* has become more dependent upon the higher levels of the rural bureaucracy who themselves constitute the major landholding interest within the community.⁹⁰

In general, the structural process in planning made the village officials not only less encumbered by traditional role conceptions and more prone to neglect their responsibilities as patrons within the village community, but also made them less involved in the formulation and administration of rural development programs.

In the Philippines, Presidents Roxas and Quirino carried similar policies of reducing rural unrest and discontent but without transforming or unifying the structure of rural agrarian society. It was not until Ramon Magsaysay's administration (1953-57) that administrative reforms and reorganization were introduced as predated by the suggestions of a U.S. Economic Survey mission to the Philippines in 1950.⁹¹ Initially, the conceptual and organizational dimensions of rural development in the Philippines were unified for future presidents to measure up to. Working through his charismatic personality that characterized his commitment to the interest of the masses, and through the combined efforts of Filipino scholars, foreign advisers and consultants from the U.S. State Department, Magsaysay advanced a rural development program based on "equity" goals.⁹² His first plan was to come out with a management schema conceding to some significant changes in the land reform program, particularly in funding and legislation for tenancy reform and land redistribution. His planned change centered especially on rationalizing the structure of rural development agencies by reorganizing them into divisions of bureaus in larger departments and as public corporations. Major changes were directed to the revision of existing statutes on land registration, liberation of government regulations on rural banks, and the distribution of public lands under a resettlement program. The National Resettlement and Rehabilitation Administration (NARRA) was created to facilitate resettlement, a scheme patterned after the American Homestead program.⁹³

Magsaysay's rural development program proved, however, to be more successful as a "psychological war" against insurgency. This, in effect, led to the declining interest in rural development during the last years of the administration after it successfully minimized rural unrest and eliminated the threat of the Huk movement. Apart from these programs directed at solving specific rural problems, the Magsaysay government also tried to encourage rural communities to undertake development projects with the least dependence on the central government in the generation of local resources. It was for this purpose that the Presidential Assistance on Community Development (PACD) was created in 1956. The organization for purely self-help projects under the *bayanihan* (cooperative) spirit was encouraged in the PACD activities. The creation of the PACD followed the attempt of Magsaysay to create a basis for barrio self-government in 1955 with the passage of the Barrio Charter Law in 1960. The law raised the status of the barrio into that of a quasi-municipal corporation with its own elective barrio executive and barrio councils and a limited degree of taxing power.

The declining attention paid on rural development continued during the succeeding administration of President Carlos Garcia. However, the following administration under President Macapagal gave more impetus and vigor for more reformist policies on rural development. President Macapagal continued

the unification of agencies engaged in rural development with the organization of the Land Reform Project Administration (LRPA) in order to come up with a unified concept of rural development administration. The LRPA was a single organization composed of five member agencies with one personnel pool. The National Land Reform Council (NLRC) which was the policy-making arm of the LRPA directed, controlled and reviewed all programs, plans, procedures, policies, projects and activities of these member agencies. This administrative unification was to precede the adoption of an integrated rural development program with double goals of equity and productivity. The result was to be the most comprehensive law on agrarian relations in the Philippines at that time. The code provided for the integration of land tenure reform and land redistribution aspects of land reform that extended credit, extension, and other services to the agricultural sector. With similar problems of implementation encountered by Magsaysay, Macapagal faced the successful opposition of the landed elites and their allies in the higher bureaucracy.

The same problem characterized the first term of President Ferdinand E. Marcos who succeeded Macapagal in 1965. Rather than antagonizing the very powerful elite class amidst the prevailing rice shortage during that period, Marcos paid less attention to tenurial and land redistribution problems of agrarian reform in favor of accelerating the goal of agricultural productivity devoted to rice. To this effect, Marcos created the Rice and Corn Production Coordinating Council (RCPCC) in 1967 focusing on campaigns and dissemination of modern agricultural technology. The RCPCC activities included the introduction of new high-yielding rice varieties (HYV), extra credit and access to modern inputs, particularly pesticides and fertilizers. Given the centralization of the RCPCC,⁹⁴ not much was done to unify rural development during the first regime of Marcos (1966-1971 or pre-martial law), except perhaps with the creation of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) when the 1963 Reform Code was amended in 1971 for the purpose of making it a more effective instrument for pursuing equity goals. The amendment included renewed interest in tenurial change and redistribution aspect of agrarian reform, emphasis on cooperative development programs based on *Samahang Nayan* (barrio associations) and a rural credit program called *Masagana 99*, and increased participatory involvement of local governments in the implementation of land reform. It was generally argued that all efforts directed at developing or improving rural condition in the Philippines since the 1930's were very weak because of the apparent absence of the "political will" to push for genuine rural development.⁹⁵

In Thailand, the year 1965 ushered a new rural development perspective with the adoption of an Accelerated Rural Development (ARD) program. There were two factors that influenced the introduction of the ARD. First was the growing insurgency problem in Northern Thailand coupled with the political disintegration in neighboring countries and second, the postulates of the American Institute for Research (AIR). The AIR which worked with the

CD department since its creation argued that in order for rural development to take place, potential social, economic, and political opportunities should exist which could be enhanced through increased investments on rural infrastructure projects.⁹⁶ Under the supervision of the Prime Minister, the ARD was established with the general goal of promoting national growth and security by increasing villager involvement in development efforts. In particular, the ARD was aimed at speeding up the planning and implementation of development projects to the rural areas through a network of effective program coordination between the central government, local administration and the private sector. With the objective of working for the benefit of the local population, the ARD gave more emphasis on the strengthening of the *Changwat* Administration Organization (CAO).

Strengthening local self-government at the *Changwat* level did not mean, however, participation of the local people in the national planning and decision-making. In the final analysis, it upgraded the top-down type of planning in rural development,⁹⁷ where local administration served as an extension of the central government. Government functional offices at the provincial and district levels were set up by traditional channels in the form of Royal Decrees by which regular governmental development and administrative activities were transmitted downward the hierarchical system.⁹⁸ Generally, local government operated from a narrow functional base because it lacked decision-making autonomy and thus, enjoyed limited power to influence exogenous changes.⁹⁹ This process was much more evident with the institutionalization of the traditional functions of the district and the village leaders with regard to central administration. In rural Thailand, administrative activity remained highly personalized, conducted on a one-to-one basis in *Changwat*—village administration. National plans and decisions were channeled to the village through the personage of the *Kamnan* (*tambon* headman) and the *Phuyaiaban* (*muban* headman).

The Search for Bureaucratic Alternatives. The seventies was characterized by what is now called the "development syndrome." Included in this was the search for alternatives to bureaucratic structure. This period saw the formulation and establishment of a scheme that focused on administrative coordination and promotion of grassroots participation in development planning and implementation at the local administrative levels.

In the Philippines, following the declaration of martial law in 1972, the Department of Local Government and Community Development (DLGCD) was created in order to take charge of the promotion of grassroots participation in development through the coordination of local government administrative activities and the encouragement of cooperative programs. In view of the government's unparalleled commitment to devote more of its resources to rural development programs than have previous administrations, efforts were taken to reorganize and reunify the rural development planning structure

and processes on the basis of tightening central controls and the improvement of the flow of policy communication to the lower levels of administration with emphasis on central-barangay linkages.

In Malaysia, the control of rural development projects and programs was assumed by the United Malay National Organization (UMNO) of the National Front Government Party by way of extensive "federalization" of administration and coordination. The control function was meant to ensure political participation of rural population through such institutions as rural cooperatives, farmers' associations, village development committees, youth clubs and women institutes. These were conceived as instrumentalities to unite the efforts of rural people with those of the central government. While the UMNO, with branches spread through the countryside, would lead in the mobilization of political participation and representation of local political leaders in rural development planning and goal-setting, rural institutions would provide for mass participation and enhance the mobilizational capacity of the government in the field of agricultural modernization, rural credit, savings, marketing and other activities such as youth farms.

Similarly, the *Inpres* program in the district of Indonesia was initiated in a manner that district governmental units are responsible for preparing and submitting the project proposals, with higher level administrative units reviewing and approving the proposals and releasing funds. As local and central planners continued to offer a high assessment of the *Inpres* effectiveness as a well-routined feature of the government's development effort, the program was provided additional and stable funds by the central government. Operating concurrently with the *Inpres* was the *Padat Karya*, otherwise known as the Food for Work Program, smaller in size but similar in objectives with the *Inpres*. Introduced in 1969, the *Padat Karya* involved undertaking labor intensive infrastructure projects in rural areas having serious unemployment and malnutrition problems.

Another alternative program which was exclusively oriented towards rural development is the *Subsidi Desa* (village subsidy) at the village level. With the intent of stimulating village participation in the development process, each village was given responsibilities to prepare project proposals under government funding, but these had to be approved by district authorities. Most of the projects financed by the *Subsidi Desa* program involved the rehabilitation and construction of irrigation and roads, purchases of cattle for breeding purposes, purchase of trucks, and building of rice barns. A significant effort for adaptation was the encouragement and recognition by the government of the traditional *gotong royong* (mutual assistance and cooperative workgroup) spirit in most activities undertaken by the program. Like the *bayanihan* in the Philippines and the *tolong menolong* in Malaysia, the practice of *gotong royong* normally involved engaging in activities related to village social welfare efforts. However, in the *Subsidi Desa*, major problems at issue in the district

and village planning activities were their (the district's and the village's) development capacity and effective or appropriate technical resources to undertake more innovative development activities. This was especially so in the village itself where it assumed responsibility for the preparation of project proposals. At the same time, it frequently lacked the technical expertise necessary to do the task effectively.

Desires or attempts to decentralize the generally centralized top-down planning were also common among the three countries. This was observable in Malaysia with the formulation and review of the 1971 Second Malaysia Plan that articulated a New Economic Policy (NEC) with its two-pronged strategy of restructuring Malaysian society and eradicating poverty among all Malaysians irrespective of race. Under the NEC, rural development changed from its conservative status to a continuous commitment for adaptation and innovation in spatial planning. The crucial consideration for adaptation was the district administration which bears on the issue of local government and the nexus between the rural Malays and the central administration. It is the point at which the administration, traditional and modern, worked its will. In particular, the district office was the focal point of rural administration, the juncture for the flow of policy from the federal and state governments and the agglomeration of grassroots demands. The district was headed by a district officer who was the territorial chief or the apex of the Sultanate subsystem, assuming a combined role of general administrator, collector of land revenue, magistrate, chairman of non-autonomous town boards, and chairman of various committees. Under him were a number of assistant district officers, each assigned responsibilities for general administration in subdistricts and functional areas such as land administration and revenue collection, community development, and office management.

The commitment for adaptation in the district planning structure included some efforts to bring the district into the national planning process through some changes in district functions but without substantially changing the colonial planning structure. Changes in functions resulted in the alteration of the once supreme position of the district officer, transforming him from a remote and unapproachable agent of foreign authority to an active promoter and prime mover of rural development. The reform in the civil service which introduced the element of role differentiation and specialization further reduced his charisma by being subject to direction from his superiors at the state and federal capitals.¹⁰⁰ However, he still maintained the role of senior authoritative representative of government.¹⁰¹ Moreover, his development role was highlighted with the bottom-up planning under the RED (Rural Economic Development) book system as a device to aggregate requests for government funding of minor projects. Under the 1961-65 five year plan, the Red Book system formed an important part of the national, state and district development plan network on rural development projects and physical ameni-

ties that summarized the relationship between the rural development and national plans.

This system followed the organizational logic of the quasi-military command hierarchy of the District Action Committee (DAC), the District Development Committee (DDC) and the District Security Committee (DSC). The DAC included the heads of all district technical departments of the federal and state governments, senior police and army officers, *wakil rakyat* (state assemblyman), and the *penghulus* (traditional leaders or administrative heads) of the *mukim* (a collection of villages constituting a parish or a subdistrict level of organization). The DDC included only the District Officer and the heads of technical departments, while the DSC comprised the police and military chiefs of the district chaired by the District Officer.

More recently, considerable attention was also given to the *mukim* and the *kampung* (village) development planning structure. The *Ketua Kampung* (village headmen) were given a new role of assisting the District Officer at the bottom levels by serving as linkages in matters of manipulating the indigenous culture or tradition for rural modernization and aggregating rural demands without stirring mass political mobilization. This change led to alterations in the role of the traditional leaders, from that of simply high status local functionaries to development leaders. Traditionally, the *penghulu* was regarded as a representative of the sultan of the state serving as a mediator in conflicts, facilitator for rural development and a salaried field agent of the government. With the decentralization of government and administration to the district through the bottom-up planning which led to the expansion of complex roles through bureaucratic specialization and democratization of politics, the *penghulu* assumed a new role in rural development administration as a broker between the villagers and supravillage officials. The consequent dilution of his traditional source of authority instituted his role as a helper to the various technical departments of approved development projects for the *mukim*. On the other hand, the *ketua kampung* who was the apex of the village micro-system has been increasingly absorbed into the rural administrative system with the creation of the Village Development Committee (VDC). In the traditional bureaucracy, he was not a part of the state service and had no legal powers nor specified duties, though he was considered the spokesman for his village community in all secular matters. Each village had a VDC composed of the members with the *ketua kampung* as chairman. Generally, both *ketua kampung* and the VDC have autonomy in making decisions affecting the village community, specially in *tolong menolong* (self-help or village cooperation and responsibility) projects. As the lowest tier in the rural development structure, they were expected to be the government's agents for various community development programs contained in the national plan.

In the case of the Philippines, all efforts leading to a bottom-up planning in rural development became evident with the creation of the Integrated Re-

organization Plan (IRP) in September 1972 when major administrative functions and substantive activities of the central government were proposed to be decentralized. Under the plan, the problems of active participation of the local levels in rural development based on a more effective coordination of planning and implementation of development programs and projects were considered as one crucial issue.

The re-emphasis on the *barangay's* participation and involvement in self-help rural projects dates back to Magsaysay's "peasant populism" policy. A similar development is observed in Malaysia where the village level is organized for aggregation and articulation of low-level demands in a way that does not affect the central goals of stability and orderly change.¹⁰²

Whether intended or not, rural programs are meant to ameliorate or to make conditions more tolerable.¹⁰³ While the intention may be to build plans from the *barangay* or the *barrio*, linking directly through the municipality above it to the province and from there to the center, political cleavages have frustrated this intention to the point where the *barangay* becomes the *target* of planning rather than the *source* of planning objectives.¹⁰⁴ Under this structural concept of rural development planning, the form and extent of rural participation is distinguished between *ex post* participation where participation becomes a response to policy initiatives taken at higher level, and *ex ante* participation where the rural population plays a direct role in the electoral process of selecting their leaders and in setting up the agenda of issues to be handled by higher policy process.¹⁰⁵

One strategy that has been identified as a means to solve this problem was the adoption of the Integrated Area Development (IAD) approach which combines the goals of "growth-with-equity." As an instrument for coordinating planning and implementation of development programs and projects between central and local levels, the IAD strategy "requires the consolidation and synchronization of the development efforts in the different sectors of the government in given geographical areas to achieve the goals of economic self-sufficiency and social equity."¹⁰⁶ This process centers on the sub-national or local government levels since these are not organized in coordinated fashion. Against the argument that "basic needs" should be met before grandiose projects are undertaken, and against the recognition that macro-economic development strategies may not be the most appropriate solution to reduce high levels of poverty in rural areas,¹⁰⁷ or the regions as presently constituted, the focus on sub-regional or sub-national planning and implementation offers an alternative to effectively reduce the disparities between regions (especially the depressed areas) and to provide for balanced economic and social progress in the country.¹⁰⁸

The planning process considers both the spatial and temporal dimensions. The rationale for the spatial dimension is based on the adjustment of functionally oriented service to a specific geographical area in the implementation

stage. The IAD approach implies the introduction of the spatial planning into the present sectorally-oriented services rendered at the provincial, city and municipal levels governed by the over-centralization of decision-making. Through the IAD approach, various sectors that are either directly or indirectly concerned with rural development are brought together within a system of vertical interdependence for coordinating planning and implementation.¹⁰⁹ As may be the case, the popular adoption of the spatial planning is a major national policy shift of decentralization aimed at promoting economic growth with greater social equity through the process of maximizing participation by rural people in decision-making.¹¹⁰

On the other hand, the temporal dimension of planning has become increasingly significant because it promotes a common perception of time by leaders, project implementors, and the ordinary citizen in the planning and implementation of development programs and projects.¹¹¹

As applied in the Philippines, the IAD planning had four categories varying in development areas. The first category covered the river basin approach. This approach takes cognizance of the presence of a major natural resource, namely, water in the planning and development of certain areas. The second category was the development planning of islands that concentrates on the promotion of a balanced development in recognition of the nature of the country and the consequent problems of transportation facilities and communication services. The provincial development approach was the third category where government development programs and projects focus on the geographic territorial jurisdiction of the province as the planning area. In the last category was the municipal development approach which takes the grouping of different geographically contiguous and adjacent municipalities as the basis of jurisdictional planning schemes.

From the outset, the adoption of the IAD planning approach for effective coordination or integration of development planning and implementation stressed the need for some politico-administrative arrangements that will provide for a comprehensive and integrated planning structure that can be utilized as specific IAD areas. A tangible expression of this concern was the creation of a Cabinet Coordinating Committee on Integrated Rural Development Projects (CCC-IRDP) in 1973. To further accelerate and strengthen the government's rural development efforts, the CCC-IRDP was superseded in 1978 by the National Council on Integrated Area Development (NACIAD). It was conceived as the central monitoring and coordinating body charged with the development of an integrated plan of action for rural development.¹¹²

Since the approval of the Integrated Reorganization Plan, the Regional Development Council (RDC) had, in response to this felt need, been organized at the regional, provincial and city/municipal levels. The RDC is composed of heads of national government agencies working in the area, local executives,

e.g., governors, mayors for the region, and representatives from the private sector, i.e., leaders of organizations who play a significant role in the development of the areas. With the assistance of a technical staff, the RDC formulates comprehensive regional development plans, coordinates the planning of sectoral regional offices and local governments, and undertakes planning studies and other related activities. In a way, the RDC is a replication of the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA), the central planning ministry which is charged with formulating definite and consistent long-range plans for economic and social development programs in consultation with the private sector and other appropriate agencies. The RDC's planning function which includes collating sectoral and local government proposals is directed, reviewed and approved according to the guidelines set by the NEDA.

The RDC's composition itself is indicative of the coordination effort, and in so far as the communication process is concerned, it has proven effective because it serves as a "talking" forum for dialogue, exchange of information, feedback and advice. Generally, however, the absence of a decisive authority and dependence on the central authority of NEDA, did not guarantee definite compliance and proper execution of its functions.

Likewise, in Indonesia, the integrated area development (by subdistrict or village cluster) technique was adopted and embodied in a special directorate-general of Community Development vested with the Ministry of Home Affairs since 1968. The social dimension of rural development following the technique considered the basic idea of the "development of the whole man" and of the entire community for self-sufficiency and self-reliance on a national basis, and the active social participation of the rural village populace.¹¹³ The Community Development used two types of approaches: The first approach is called the community education (CE) or the *Penmas* propounded by a dedicated group of teachers believing in progressivism. The movement was founded in 1946 on the belief that CE is "the foundation for all activities of development of the individual, the community and the nation."¹¹⁴ The CE program was geared to stimulate efforts of community organization for self-help by means of literacy campaigns through social persuasion and the establishment of community libraries at the districts and villages. The second approach to community development was represented by the creation of Village Social Welfare Institute (VSWI) premised on the tenet of the "unity of man and society" for the achievement of social harmony in community relations. The VSWI operated on feelings of social responsibility through actions aimed at particularly eliminating the suffering of specific disadvantaged groups: orphans, the aged, victims of crisis or disasters, etc. The actors or the so-called change agents were members of the village community itself.

Like Indonesia, Thailand saw the strengthening of the national government's Community Development (CD) program as a new perspective to rural development at the onset of the 1970's. Under the CD program, Development

Councils (DC) were adopted in the most rural government units. The DC department, through its provincial and district officials, organized *Tambon* and *Muban* DC as the primary focus of its rural development program. This DC approach had been observed by the CD department as the most appropriate method for strengthening village leadership capabilities and improving rural living conditions. The DC is composed of respected members of the *Tambon* who plan activities, request necessary external assistance, and monitor project implementation in their respected areas after their training. The elitist composition of the DC, however, only made the CD a program for the larger progressive villages rather than for smaller, poorer and remoter ones. In other words, due to limited resources with the ARD, the delegation of authority and responsibility to the rural government units by the central government had been characterized by deconcentration rather than decentralization.¹¹⁵ This process of deconcentration followed the rationalization of the planning system at the local levels based on rural conditions and needs with the establishment of the Rural Youth Program (RYP). The RYP was charged with promoting cooperation and improving the living standards of the youth through vocational training and occupational promotions. Unfortunately, the RYP has not been given adequate economic and social incentives by the central government.

In its continuing commitment to improve the administrative organization of the ARD, however, the Royal Thai government further created the *Sukhaphihan* Council (SC) or the Sanitary District. The SC was a local government unit established in 1952. Its membership included the District Officer, four additional District Officials, the *Kamnan*, the *Phuyaiban*, and elected representatives of the District area. This body possessed both legislative and executive responsibilities that included planning and disbursement of local and grant-in-aid funds from the central government for rural development projects. Generally conceived as an effective unit of self-development and efficient distributor of development resources at the rural grassroots level, the SC met problems in accomplishing these objectives because it was neither financially nor administratively independent of the central government. It was not until the creation of the *Tambon* Council Committee (TCC) that efforts to indigenize the existing rural development administrative organization and planning system were initially undertaken. The TCC represented the Royal Thai government's most recent attempt to expand the decision-making process and the representative character of rural institutions.¹¹⁶ The formal authority and duties of the TCC were based on the local administration of 1897 and 1914 which were partially stipulated in Section 34, as follows:

Matters in connection with the good government of the *Tambon* which fall within the duty of the *Kamnan* include the proper observance of the laws by the inhabitants, protecting their welfare, bringing matters concerning their general welfare before the Governor of the Province and the Chief of the District, making known to the people all Government orders and carrying out the same in such matters as the collection of taxes within the *Kamnan*. The *Kamnan* should be efficiently assisted by the *Phuyaiban*.

(Muban administrators) and the Medical Officer of the Tambon consistently with their official position.¹¹⁷

Other commitments towards promoting rural development planning at the ground levels in these Southeast Asian countries indicated by their efforts towards the improvement of the supply of services as well as physical inputs to farmers and of delivery systems through traditional farmers' organizations and rural cooperatives constitute the institutional bases of rural development. For example, farmers' associations in Malaysia especially demonstrated exceptional successes not only in getting around the shortcoming of the Western model of extension but also in providing a format for group-oriented extension of new practices and technologies.¹¹⁸ Malaysian Farmers' Association was a corporate rather than an individualistic base of small agriculture units patterned after the Taiwan Farmers' Association, but somewhat modified and adapted to suit Malaysian conditions. The general principle of the group-based activity was the *tolong menolong*, variously known as mutual and work parties or reciprocal labor exchange groups, which is deeply steeped in the traditional village life and subsistence agriculture. Believing that credibility for the people depends on the sustained success of the Farmers' Association, the present Malaysian government made it a policy to restructure it into a more viable economic institutional device by integrating the spirit of the *tolong menolong* into the lowest level of administrative structure for rural development planning. The model for the restructuring was the multi-purpose Farmers' Association of Taiwan. Between 1936 and 1966, the Department of Agriculture sent two hundred extension officers and farm leaders to Taiwan to study the operation of the Farmers' Association. In exchange, the Taiwan government sent two senior specialists on farmers' association to Malaysia under the auspices of the Asia Foundation. As a result, the Malaysian Parliament passed the Farmers' Association Act in February 1967 establishing pilot schemes in each Malaysian state, structurally organized into three-tier systems—Area Farmers Association, State Farmers' Association and National Farmers' Association. At the Area Farmers' Association, the village formed household farm and small agricultural units comprising the lowest organization. To demonstrate its greater increasing support for the Farmers' Association and other traditional institutions, the national government created the Farmer Organization Authority (FOA) to properly integrate them and to resolve political tensions arising from their inter-organizational conflict.

Along with giving importance to the role of Farmers' Association in rural development, Malaysia also institutionalized the participation of statutory bodies or public corporations in rural development. Institutionalization meant the definition of roles of said bodies and corporations in terms of either independent or added elements in the rural development planning structure. The establishment of these organizations would serve as an alternative in anticipation of possible shortcomings of the existing rural development programs.

There were three main reasons for establishing these new organizations:

First is the search for a corporate form of development planning and implementation that is free from the rigidity and preponderousness of the regular bureaucracy. Secondly, the proliferation of public corporations represents a reaction to the free enterprise system. It explicitly relates to the greater interventionist economic role of government and its articulated policy goals of restructuring the racial economic relations, reducing rural poverty and correcting regional inequities. Thirdly, public corporations have been favored over voluntary institutions in rural development because... only such bodies have the capacity to promote integrated planning and accelerated development of vast areas.¹¹⁹

As a whole, these rural-oriented bodies and corporations were calculated to affect the agricultural cycle both at the input and output ends. Together with individual state economic development corporations, these new organizational structures represented a vastly increased scale of operations and commitment by the public sector in rural development planning scheme.

In comparison with Malaysia, the Philippines did not only recognize the role of farmers' organizations in rural development process, but also emphasized cooperative development programs as in the case of the *Samahang Nayon* and *Masagana 99*. The implementation of these programs was supposed to demonstrate a change in the nature of the relationship between the Philippine elite and rural masses by giving increased attention to local self-reliance and local control of rural programs. However, in actual operation, the rules and regulations governing these government cooperatives emphasized central government supervision making them instruments of central government control over the rural population. Despite their very nature as rural cooperatives, the *Samahang Nayon* and the *Masagana 99* and other governmental cooperatives like the *Kilusang Nayon*, illustrated the topdown approach.¹²⁰ Whatever powers the government left to these rural cooperatives were taken over by the better-off members, leaving the poor peasants devoid of meaningful participation in major policy decisions affecting their own affairs.¹²¹

However, local para-governmental and private or Church organizations engaged in rural development activities seemed to be more successful in articulating development problems in rural areas and in initiating reforms within the existing order. Notable among these private organizations is the Federation of Free Farmers (FFF) which, so far, is the largest and most extensive. Other non-government organizations involved in rural development programs and projects include the Philippine Rural Reconstruction Movement (PRRM), the Philippine Business for Social Progress (PBSP), and Sariling Sikap, Inc., among others.¹²²

The FFF was founded during Magsaysay's agrarian reform program in 1953 by a group of Catholic lay people headed by Jeremias Montemayor, a graduate of the Jesuit-run Ateneo de Manila University. Guided by the social doctrine of the Catholic Church, the FFF generally seeks to liberate the peasant farmer from all forms of social injustices, accompanied by the organization and education of farmers. The irony, however, is that while it was basically a peasant organization since its founding, the FFF hanged on an overly centralized elitist leadership. A large percentage of its membership, including its founder and president, come from non-farmer professionals drawn from the wealthy landed elites who are also referred to as "technocrats." Obviously, the highly technical leadership qualifications would outrightly deprive the poor peasant of representative leadership. In fact, the national leadership takes on the primary responsibility of articulating and advancing what it interprets to be the interest and needs of its members. The National Policy Board (NPB) formulates the national planning policy at the highest level, while the National Executive Office (NEXO) is the administrative body which executes policies laid down by the NPB. The local leaders at the provincial and barangay levels depend on guidelines from the national office located at Manila for their direction. In effect, there is no guarantee that the control of the FFF by members of classes traditionally opposed to the peasantry can be eliminated or at least minimized. Generally, the centralization within the organization parallels the centralization prevailing in Philippine national development planning machinery. From the outset, it may be said that, in the past, many programs and projects were planned from the drawing boards of national planning agencies and then implemented oftentimes without previous consultation and involvement of the intended beneficiaries.

Indonesia's *Beda Usalia Unit Desa* (BUUD) or Village Working Unit may be seen as operating under similar conditions as the Farmers' Association in Malaysia and the FFF and cooperatives in the Philippines. The BUUD, representing a cooperative organization presumably controlled by the farmers and the government, began in 1971. It sought to protect farmers' interests and was directed at improving rural conditions.¹²³ The unit of development activities was assigned to the sub-districts, where the BUUD was projected for each sub-district with all other village cooperatives under its umbrella.

Along with the government's policy of promoting agricultural modernization, through the introduction of the High Yielding (Rice) Varieties (HYV) technology, the BUUD was ascribed official functions of credit extension, marketing and processing, the distribution of rice and agricultural inputs such as fertilizers, pesticides, rice mills, etc. The serious deficiencies in manpower and training which had affected the delivery of extension services to the rural poor prompted the BUUD to likewise attend to the dissemination of new technological information in agricultural production at the village level. In many aspects, the BUUD represented the effort of the government to reduce private

sector control over the production and marketing of rice and to extend these functions to the public sector. More importantly, the BUUD, together with its member components, the *Koperta* and the *Burjas Gotong Royong*, was to become a means by which the weaker sectors of the rural economy could participate in the planning and implementation of development processes. Specifically, this goal has been reinforced by the government by emphasizing the distribution aspect of services throughout the entire village in order to achieve certain equity objectives.

From this setup, the Indonesian rural development planning structure and its impact on the grassroots masses might at least be gauged from the BUUD's horizontal and vertical linkages and the extent to which it achieved its ascribed functions. The horizontal relationships of the BUUD with the higher administrative bureaucracy and other institutions was very strong. Somehow, under strong supervision from the Ministry of Cooperatives, this structure was beneficial to the financial and administrative capabilities of the BUUD. This is so because cooperative officials were under the control of local elites and the bureaucratic technocrats at the higher levels of administration. In contrast, the BUUD's ties or links with the farmers who constitute the main body of the village populace was not as strong. This also applied to the sub-district unit of administrative structure covered by its organization with an average population of around 50,000 people or 10,000 families. The BUUD's strong ties with the bureaucratic structure made it difficult for a significant percentage of the local populace to identify their interest with those of the BUUD. For this reason, the farmers were unable to view the BUUD as a partner that will work towards a common goal.

As a whole, the BUUD had suffered deficiencies from being burdened with goals that are poorly defined and too broadly generalized. For in most cases, the BUUD was assigned the task of improving the rural conditions of the village poor. However, there was no accompanying effort on the part of the central government to specify how it is to achieve such aim. Without these specific guidelines, the BUUD may still continue to operate, but it is likely that they will not function in a manner that will improve the welfare of rural communities.

In recognition of such shortcoming, two major modern delivery systems have been adopted and designed by the *BIMAS Gotong Royong* and Family Planning Program (FPP) in order to accelerate the productivity-oriented strategy of rural development. In the *Bimas*, farmers were first approached through traditional and time-tested channels of the civil administration that are linked to the village headman who was expected to persuade and organize farmers for receiving extension services and credit facilities. Discovering that the village headman's approach was ineffective, a second strategy was implemented. A team of newly recruited specialist-field-personnel was brought in which included a bank man, an extension worker, fertilizer distributors and

a "cooperatives" man to serve a cluster of villages. Joining the team, at a later stage, were the better-off farmers and a functionary of the local branch of the government's rice-purchasing agency for the state's rice stock.

In the FPP, family planning field workers relied on the group approach and house-to-house visits to family planning clinics to reach their target clients of fertile and married women. Each sub-district had one or two family planning clinics served by a team of one doctor, midwives, assistant midwives, a clerk and field workers to visit villages. The adoption of both Inpres and Bimas programs was based on the conviction of the national economic planners that any program pursued according to a set time-table would work both in terms of national development goals as well as individual gains for its clients.¹²⁴

Recognizing the significant roles played by traditional local level units in rural development program, the strengthening of the institutional bases of rural development was rationalized in Thailand recently. The effort is based on the assumption that traditional roles balancing hierarchical and bureaucratic principles will facilitate efficient rural development decisions that provide benefits to the rural population.¹²⁵ Religious institutions, like the Buddhist Sangha comprised the first traditional unit involved in education, health, social welfare, social control, banking, construction and other activities related to local improvement schemes. Planning and implementation of various projects were jointly agreed upon by the Sangha and the residents of a rural area.

The second traditional local unit was represented by loosely extended kinship groups and indigenous associations of farmers that operate under the principle of mutual cooperation and self-help. For example, traditional irrigation organizations concerned primarily with the problem of water were very common in Northern Thailand. The government provides them with some of the infrastructural facilities to help speed up the expansion of intensified irrigated areas (Thai Development Plan 1977-1981). Cooperative activities were normally done by the members themselves by selecting a canal chief to distribute water equally, to supervise a canal maintenance, and to organize labor for irrigation construction. Moreover, central government believes that the strengthening of indigenous organizations is a vital component for developing agriculture in rural areas.

The last category of traditional institutions was the private sector in the provincial district and village levels. This group plays an expanding development role in all areas of rural Thailand by providing additional revenues for the national government's marketing, transportation, and agricultural inputs including credit institutions and extension units.

To a large degree, the utility of rural development changed and the techniques or methods adopted depended on how well they can be adapted to rural conditions and needs. Somehow, through these adaptation or

indigenization processes the villager acquired a legitimizing power. Through their leaders, they were made to define decision-making, participation, and representation within the specific content of their own cultural environment and practices. However, it was not the duty of the villagers to participate in the planning and decision-making processes. Direct village participation occurred only after a decision has been made by the local leaders as the villagers are called to behave in accordance with new decisions. In the traditional local units, the system usually operated smoothly because rural leaders are believed to be sensitive to rural conditions and can make decisions acceptable to most villagers. Moreover, farmers readily accepted the authoritative style of the government because of attitudinal factors within the traditional Thai society. The capacity and the willingness of Thai farmers to respond to policy demands from the central government may be seen as a function of whether or not the returns are realized. As a whole, rural development project planning and implementation still resided primarily with central government officials and strongly emphasized the hierarchical top-down approach.¹²⁶

In the attempt to decentralize central authority, it was deconcentration of such authority to the Changwat administrative organization rather than devolution of the same authority to the local bodies, that allows participatory planning system. Nevertheless, Thailand's experience with rural development had been largely one of overly tight administration of programs and projects characterized by an efficient network of linkages between the top and bottom levels of government.

Unique to Malaysia's rural development planning structure was the role played by the Operation Room and the RED (Rural Economic Development) Book system. It represents the most innovative commitments of the Malaysian, leaders particularly, Tun Razak, in rural development administration. The technique involved primarily the identification of development projects from the smallest administrative unit, the translation of these projects into action schedules displayed in the National Operations Room, and the monitoring of progress against these schedules of regular briefing sessions attended by all cabinet members and senior servants. It was this technique that enabled Malaysia to achieve a rapid pace in rural development in the 1960's and the early 1970's.¹²⁷ The Operations Room and the Red Book system was aimed to plan rural development projects reflecting the felt needs of the village people, to accelerate their implementation, and to coordinate the development activities of various government departments in the service of the rural poor.

Each district, state and federal government level was required to install its own operations rooms to guide development planners and implementors as to the progress of the project which is systematically charted in the red books on maps and wall charts to determine whether a project was on schedule or lagging behind and should be corrected for proper implementation. An important activity in the operations room was the policy of Tun Razak on the

discipline of civil servants that required attitudinal and behavioral changes or "a change in heart and mind" from colonial bureaucratic practices and habits toward a more dynamic service oriented development.¹²⁸ For Tun Razak, surprise visits in the operations room and on project sites were also important in the process of discipline, particularly where implementors are promoted for demonstrated success, and punished for misrepresenting their progress. Through the system, the state and district development administration would be linked in the national planning, operational and evaluation stages. The district operations room was concerned with small projects since the felt needs are expected to be brought to the district rural development committee. The operations room handles large projects and certain national aggregate data where they are evaluated and approved and examined for feasibility and implementation. The Five Year Plan (1976-80) created the Economic Planning Unit (EPU) which was responsible for monitoring project implementation especially when the programs or projects take a long period to complete and additional funds may become necessary.¹²⁹ The irony, however, is that the general operations room has not institutionalized a program-monitoring or management-central device. It comes to life once a month when Tun Razak holds dramatic regular or special briefings with senior officials and department heads, or when foreign visitors or dignitaries are briefed on Malaysia's rural development institutions and programs.

One significant impact of the Malaysian experience, though, was its spill-over to the Philippines which tried vainly to adopt an Operations Room and a Green Book to monitor the implementation of rural development projects. In addition, the Philippines also established an Infrastructures Operations Center (IOC) which monitored the execution of schoolbuilding, road and bridges, port and airport projects.

The conclusion that is clearly drawn from the above discussion is that with the inefficacy of the highly centralized and hierarchical structure in carrying out the rural development program, alternative mechanisms were devised and tried. The search for such alternatives hinged largely on the recognition and utility of traditional and indigenous institutions. The greater impact of these alternatives was enhancing community involvement—if not direct people's participation in achieving development goals. However, the meaning, intent and process of participation need to be redefined further within the context of community values and priorities.

Problems of Adaptation for Endogenous Development

The experience at adaptation for endogenous development has not been an easy process for the Southeast Asian countries. In the two areas focused upon in this study, namely, the civil service system and rural development programs, problems have been encountered.

The adaptations of modern personnel administration in the developing countries have brought about the following problems:

(1) Personnel administration processes and procedures have been borrowed without regard to the national culture and norms of the developing nations. They were transplanted into a new culture. Conflict was bound to occur and the concomitant result was a failure in the infusion of technology.

(2) There was an inordinate concern for the form rather than the substance of personnel administration. The formal procedures and form for establishing a civil service system such as the application of the merit principle in recruitment, compensation, and training became the main focus of the adoption process. The rationale and requirements for such personnel procedures were not internalized by the agents of change or innovators in the bureaucracy.

(3) Training as a tool in management reform basically emphasized increasing skills in applying new techniques and procedures. It failed to motivate, inspire, or change attitudes toward work or productivity and excluded the social and human component such as relationships among the personnel and between public sector personnel and the client groups, *viz.*, the people to be served. Training became a formalistic and mechanical activity which disregarded the more dynamic and behavioral aspects of change. Training was basically designed to fit individuals into the formal hierarchical bureaucracy, ignoring the social content of the environment in which people work and reside.

Several problems in the adaptation of indigenous institutions in rural development programs have also been identified:

(1) The use of local structures and institutions may not be a departure from the colonial experience. As the study shows during the colonial period, the local institutions were employed as devices for maintaining control over the colonies. The Philippine *barangay* approach simply resurrects a traditional institution which had been utilized by the Spanish colonial administrators in maintaining law and order and collecting taxes.

(2) Local institutions and leaders may serve as gatekeepers to development, thereby restricting the flow of benefits and resources to the people. The *penghulu* in Indonesia as a broker between villagers and supra village officials (*i.e.*, governmental) could possibly filter the exchange of transactions and the perception of community felt needs. The same could be said of the sultans in Malaysia.

(3) The local structures established recently may be indigenous in the use of nomenclature and designation of leaders. However, the form and intentions are still not indigenous in the sense that these were mere facilitative devices for management purposes. Examples are the *Samahang Nasyon* in the Philippines, the *BUUD* in Indonesia, and the *Area Farmer's Association* in Malaysia. Still there was a top-bottom decision either to create new local institutions

or to recognize existing local institutions as mechanisms for implementation of given programs and projects.

(4) Existing policy strategies themselves remain unexamined thereby perpetrating the assumption that these are congruent with the perception and priorities of the rural poor. The programs for rural development, for example, assume uniform standards and applications without considering the specific requirements and conditions of individual communities.

(5) The notion of participation in rural development programs is unidimensional and not a meaningful interactive process. To indigenize and promote participation through consultative or community councils, for example, is inadequate in the absence of reciprocal and substantive roles in decision-making. The purpose of indigenous institutions in rural development is simply to react and give legitimacy to already existing decisions.

The process of adaptation of public administration technology requires the examination of the basic conditions and premises underlying such a technology. For example, the notion of personnel classification has to be considered within the context of the social values and attitudes towards status and individual relationships. The developing nations initially rushed in to adopt public administration technology and models believing that what was good for the U.S. or France is also good for the Philippines, Thailand or Indonesia. There was no conscious effort towards adaptation and a re-examination of the assumptions under each model or procedure. The result was actually an indirect adaptation through the resistance and modification by the personnel in the bureaucracy which had to cope with the normal routines and activities within the organization. The scaled down adoption was also the result of the absence or lack of resources and absorptive capacity in the bureaucracy. This is exemplified in the problem areas in public personnel administration.

There is a growing awareness of the need to indigenize the application of public administration technology according to the scale, pace, capacity and priority of the developing countries. To begin this process is to look inwardly into the socio-cultural-historical conditions of each country and to conduct an inventory of the indigenous characteristics and institutions that would favorably or unfavorably affect national development. The indigenization process does not mean, however, the mere substitution of the present technology with pre-colonial practices or institutions which may be impractical or irrelevant to contemporary needs. The process refers to a conscious effort to appraise the value-content and relevance of external technology on a selective basis and adapt it to the peculiar needs and conditions of the country concerned. This methodological strategy is consistent with the thrust on the conceptual review on indigenization. Moreover, the basic issues stated in the beginning of this study are not to be sidetracked in the pursuit of developing goals. Such issues as self-reliance, preservation of national dignity, resource capacity and standards of relevance and appropriateness should be taken into account. In evolving the strategy towards

indigenization, the interest of the developing nation-state is primordial regardless of the source of the idea—whether a Western or Asian leader or theorist. Each country has to establish an appropriate methodology to develop the indigenous strategies and institutions that would also absorb and adapt the external technology. It is a relevant approach to the contemporary crisis to confront the persistent problem of poverty and inequality in the rural areas.

Indigenization: A Conceptual Review

Indigenization has been considered as one of the professed objectives of administrative reforms which developed from the Third World countries' increasing commitment towards a new and more mature approach in public administration.¹³⁰ This new thinking or the emergence of a soul-searching quest for a positive administrative role in development, is part of the so-called "islands of development," that significantly considers the merit of undertaking pilot experimentation in new methods and techniques with full consideration of the indigenous conditions.¹³¹ However, the issue of indigenization has been neglected at all points and processes of this new trend of inquiry in administrative reform and innovations: it has been mixed up in various other issues such as adoption or adaptation or appropriate technology.

In all discussions on administrative reform that run from rational, scientific and neutral considerations to a more socio-cultural, dynamic and evolutionary approach, indigenization necessarily follows the processes of adopting some elements of western administrative technology and adapting them into the indigenous culture and society. Where there is radical adaptation, all attempts at indigenization are possible. This section is a modest and preliminary inquiry into some basic ideas of indigenization, particularly in relation to the problem of administrative reform.

Indigenization, in its generic meaning, refers to "firmly established values and traditions which have shaped for many generations the religious, family, social and national life of the people." Indigenization evolved as a movement in the former colonial underdeveloped countries to rediscover the authentic values and cultural genius of the people which have been handed down from generation to generation and are identified as truly their own.¹³² In the context of cultural development, indigenization goes along with the version of culture as a dynamic reality which enriches itself through assimilation without destroying its very core. This is termed as the irony of "cultural continuity" where the process of indigenization implies a selective integration and assimilation of western cultural elements with indigenous culture in the context of a national search for cultural identity.¹³³

In social sciences terms, indigenization is essentially a process of change in values,¹³⁴ or a critical attitude towards anything foreign in an attempt to explore and develop new methods and theories that are relevant for an

understanding of society. This does not only mean, however, glorifying indigenous traditions but also taking a future orientation towards the search for a universally valid paradigm.¹³⁵ Implicitly, indigenization is the emergence of self-consciousness that leads to the liberation of the Third World countries from dependence on models and methodology of foreign origin, and reliance on alien description for understanding native culture and societies.¹³⁶ From this flows the argument that Asian social scientists and scholars must be emancipated from the value bias of Western concepts and postulates of reasoning.¹³⁷

In its extreme formulation, indigenization appears almost as "a 'revolt' against domination of western concepts, theories and methodologies which are decried as 'unsuitable' and 'irrelevant' in the Asian context."¹³⁸ This chauvinistic definition of indigenization is premised on the claim that the importation or transfer of western technology had generally been "inappropriate," because it "failed to give birth to creative theories designed for, and derived from, Asian realities."¹³⁹ Such claim encourages Asian social scientists and scholars to undergo a truly creative engagement with their own culture and society, making use, in the process, of frameworks that provide standards of relevance to the experience and aspirations of their own people.¹⁴⁰

Taking all the above arguments together, what appears to be of basic issue is that the process of indigenization is not necessarily directed against western counterparts but against those scholars of underdeveloped nations, whether in the social sciences or in public administration, who had allowed themselves to become instruments of academic colonialism. By no accident, internal colonization appears to be more pervasive and pernicious against any concern and commitment to a grassroots consciousness.

Broadly defined, indigenization in social science parlance is "the development of rational social sciences that are self-reliant, self-sufficient and self-directing, or in other words, autonomous and independent, with respect to all aspects of the vital functions of the community, including its ability to relate to other communities on an equal, reciprocal basis."¹⁴¹ According to this definition, the development of a strong indigenous social science community requires support and protection both from national effort and the utility of potential foreign resources in enhancing indigenous development. By implication, indigenization encourages mutual cooperation between national and international commitments to national development goals by eliminating all forms of existing policies of economic, political, cultural and geographical dependency and domination. But the focal point of indigenization is, by definition, the national level.¹⁴² This suggests that the process of indigenization is possible under a condition where all forms of economic and political independence have been fully attained.

Parallel to this view of indigenization is UNESCO's claim that modernization is no longer seen merely as a race to catch up with the more favored

nation, which was the idea until recently, but rather as a turning to account of the developing societies' potentialities in addition to a fairer distribution of wealth at the national level. . . . Cultural identity and certain forms of authenticity are now called for as factors in development.¹⁴³ Following this claim, the indigenization process, whether it is done by the indigenous people or by the outsiders, aims principally at a redefinition of focus or development of alternative perspectives and new paradigms on critical issues of national development and public policy—giving considerable regard to historical and cultural specifications.¹⁴⁴ This holds; whether it is an Asian or Westerner who recommends indigenization is immaterial. But this is not true, and it makes the big difference, when the former must do the work of indigenization. . . . "it is to speak of a new responsibility—that of natives constructing their own mirror to reflect new realities."¹⁴⁵ It may make sense, thus, to talk of indigenization of public administration as for example, in the Filipinization of the government under American colonial rule and the Malayization of the Malaysian public service.¹⁴⁶

Evidently, indigenization does not mean rejection of one's native culture and tradition in favor of modernization, nor the return to primitive or discarded ways. In both choices, there is the inevitable suppression of traditional culture that may cause irreparable damage to the people's native genius and to its racial and cultural identity.¹⁴⁷ This argument rather falls on the processes of adoption and adaptation.

The Adoption Issue

Adoption has often been interpreted as "technological diffusion" or the "transfer" of technology to underdeveloped countries.¹⁴⁸ It connotes a unidirectional movement from a radiating to a recipient society rather than suggesting a degree of dynamic reciprocal relationship.¹⁴⁹ This process presupposes either copying the methods and techniques of advanced countries and transplanting them into the indigenous culture in order to do meaningful work,¹⁵⁰ or introducing a much superior culture and technology with all its assumptions of applicability, usefulness, appropriateness, and suitability into a national culture that is presumably inferior. In administrative terms, the transfer of administrative techniques often provokes structural distortions, inappropriate socio-political mutations and excessive bureaucratic surveillance, thus increasing social inequality and further widening the gap that already exists between a society and its administration.¹⁵¹ However, it is argued that in considering the significance of endogenous development in the Third World, "it necessitates transfers of knowledge from different cultural settings to hasten economic modernization, while respecting cultural identities."¹⁵² In operational political terms, one would be faced with comparing

the performance of political systems according to their versatility in responding to pressures of different kinds without significantly altering their institutions and processes.¹⁵³ This is often the case because adoption has characterized the heavy influences of foreign administrative systems on developing countries which have been carried over from the colonial period.

The process of adoption is evident with the widespread technical assistance programs in the field of public administration sponsored by the United Nations and some economically advanced countries, especially the United States. The premise here is that once some of the latest administrative techniques are transplanted in a massive scale into the newly developing countries, remarkable administrative improvements will result.

The adoption, for example, of the merit system and the balanced budget policy by developing countries may well demonstrate the problem of adoption. The merit system, as opposed to the traditional spoils system and patronage appointment, has as its first principle the appointment of public employees solely on their competence which are examined by an impartial authority according to specified objective standards. A balanced budget, on the other hand, requires, according to modern standards, a high capacity of the government for improving administrative infrastructure that is necessary for increasing revenues and for better utilization of resources.¹⁵⁴

Despite the good intentions of these arrangements, however, the results of adoption or transplantations of technology has seldom been successful. Increasingly, the wisdom of copying or borrowing the methods and techniques of developed countries has demonstrated many reverses and failures. This, in turn, has led to a new brand of thinking being referred to as the "era of adaptation" that considers the significance of endogenous development in the Third World countries.¹⁵⁵ Somehow, the recognition of the problem of adoption has caused the slow demise of the issue of adoption. Both developed and developing nations have been increasingly concerned with reconciling the administrative apparatus with its own culture and society, emphasizing especially its endogenous character, in order to ensure sound development.

The Adaptation Issue

The issue of adaptation is the more rational and popular language of public administrative reform. Adaptation begins with the task of determining which elements from traditions and cultural genius of ethnic people might appropriately be admitted into the colonial culture.¹⁵⁶ The same may be said of technological adaptation that supports the thinking that technology is neutral and that indigenous cultural practices must change to fit the adopted western or colonial technology.¹⁵⁷ Implicitly in adaptation, the native culture depends for its meaning and life on the foreign culture in the process of assimilation.

In indigenization, the reverse is true, where western culture or technology sets its base into the national or indigenous culture and society giving it strength, enrichment and meaning. Indigenization would rather make the national culture do the task of absorbing some meaningful elements of western technology where their appropriateness and suitability are to be critically examined.¹⁵⁸ This idea has been similarly conceived as the crucial capacity required for introducing and sustaining creativity in administrative units, at whatever levels, for the conscious pursuit of development goals.¹⁵⁹ Generally speaking, adaptation "consists in reducing through administrative reforms, the discrepancies existing between the written provisions, procedures, methods, structure and organization of public administration and the achievement of its aims, having regard to actual socio-cultural circumstances."¹⁶⁰

In contrast with adoption, adaptation has been demonstrated in the borrowing policies of Asian countries on Western administrative technology but with consideration on indigenous socio-cultural values and conditions. Examples are the rural or community development programs in the Philippines and Malaysia. Two notable Philippine experiences discussed in this article are the Infrastructure Operations Center and the Rice and Corn Production Coordinating Council, both of which attend to high-priority programs of President Ferdinand E. Marcos. In Malaysia, the Operations Room Technique is also discussed and cited as an outstanding case which aims principally at improving the planning and implementation of economic and social change. Faced with the task of national integration and economic development, Tun Abdul Razak introduced the Operation Room Technique as an administrative device to coordinate the military, police, and administrative personnel for rural development programs.

Given these models of functional specialization in administrative reforms, the strengthening of the central managerial offices common in developing countries has been reinforced by the integration of paternalistic and hierarchical aspects of indigenous Asian societies and culture.¹⁶¹

The Appropriate Technology Issue

Aside from being mixed up with adoption and adaptation, indigenization is often confused with the concept of "appropriate technology." Like indigenization, appropriate technology is an approach or a process described as an evidence of a "cultural revolution" in development thinking.¹⁶² This approach essentially includes the elements of self-reliance, local initiative, and local control that have far-reaching implications when they are logically applied to the development structure as it now exists. As with any cultural revolution, this appropriate technology approach threatens to turn the whole organizational structure upside-down, and shake up the old ways of doing

things. Taking the demystification of western knowledge and the triumph of the common man as one of its prime principles, appropriate technology aims to remove from the list of obstacles to development many of the inequities of colonial systems that are dominated by the expensive technology and economic power of the rich countries.¹⁶³ This principle is described as "people's technology" or participatory technology development process that comes in part from a philosophy which measures development in terms of the people's skills and their ability to solve their own problems.¹⁶⁴ The general argument is that appropriate technology can only come from the elements of the people by whom and for whom it is to be used once they have successfully realized their own political and economic strength.¹⁶⁵

In both indigenization and the appropriate technology approach, the role of the outsider is limited to that of catalyst both in mobilizing indigenous people to collectively address their problems and in providing some technical supports. What distinguishes appropriate technology from indigenization is the premise that western culture or technological elements originally adopted or adapted by the underdeveloped countries assume the role of promoting self-reliance, independence and people's participation. Rather than putting potential indigenous socio-cultural components at the root of reform processes, they are suppressed or trampled by upon foreign technological elements that are assumed to be more superior.

From the outset, it appears evident that indigenization would be a more relevant and appropriate approach in the increasing commitment and desire of the underdeveloped countries for a more mature theory, alternative perspectives, new paradigms and a more dynamic practice of public administration. In fact, as an objective of administrative reform, indigenization has evolved as a reflection on and remedy to the false doctrines of adoption, adaptation and appropriate technology. Today, indigenization is becoming a declaration among Third World countries for authentically defining an ideal development model for dealing with poverty that is based on polarities and contrasts between western and native, between modern and traditional, between centralization and decentralization, and national and rural or community development goals.

Endnotes

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